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I. INTRODUCTION 
The opportunity to own one’s home has long been considered part and 
parcel of the American Dream. Homeownership, so it is contended, 
provides a pathway to upward mobility, fosters good citizenship, and is a 
reliable form of long-term savings.1 Even in the wake of the recent 
foreclosure crisis, a complex phenomenon in which homes plunged millions 
of American households into financial distress, the nation has by and large 
kept the faith in homeownership.2 
For the last century, the federal government has unabashedly promoted 
homeownership. It supports credit markets to help make home mortgages 
affordable, offers counseling and financial assistance to prospective low 
income homebuyers, and, most pertinent to this article, provides a 
collection of income tax breaks directly to homeowners. These tax breaks 
(which this article will refer to as “homeowner subsidies”) are no small 
matter. In 2017 alone, it is estimated that the three principal homeowner 
subsidies—the mortgage interest deduction, the property tax deduction and 
the exclusion of home sale capital gains—will total $135 billion in forgone 
tax revenue.3 This amounts to the country’s second largest tax expenditure, 
                                                                                                                 
 1 See, e.g., Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing, NATIONAL ASS’N OF 
REALTORS (April 2012), https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/migration_files/social-
benefits-of-stable-housing-2012-04.pdf. 
 2 Eric S. Belsky, The Dream Lives On: The Future of Homeownership in America 2 
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 13-1, 2013), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w13-1_belsky_0.pdf. 
 3 H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, S. COMM. ON FINANCE, AND STAFF OF THE J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2016-2020, at 33 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET]. 
It is worth pointing out that Congressional estimates of forgone revenue associated with 
homeowner subsidies, while useful in understanding their costs, are not equal to the gain to 
the federal budget that would result if Congress eliminated the subsidies. Taxpayer behavior 
would change to some extent upon elimination of the subsidies. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. 
COMM., 106TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1, 8 (Comm. Print 
1999). For example, a homeowner might move less frequently if she faced the prospect of 
capital gains tax on each sale. 
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and nearly triple what Congress budgeted for the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and all of its programs in 2017.4 The 
subsidies are premised on the rationale that homeownership is a good 
investment for homeowners and also creates spillover benefits for those 
who live around them (what are known as “positive externalities” 5) because 
homeowners take better care of their properties and are more invested and 
involved in their communities.6 Therefore, it is a choice that ought to be 
encouraged. 
A great deal of criticism has already been directed at the homeowner 
subsidies for failing to do what they are ostensibly meant to accomplish. A 
veritable phalanx of economists, policy analysts, and academics have 
dissected and assailed the subsidies, contending that they neither increase 
the country’s overall homeownership rate nor cause those who are on the 
fence about or face financial barriers to purchasing a home to do so.7 
Instead, the primary effect of the subsidies appears to be to encourage those 
higher income households that would already buy homes to buy larger and 
more expensive ones.8 Perversely, they may even drive up home prices in 
those supply-limited housing markets where home affordability is most 
problematic.9 These outcomes are due to some serious design defects in the 
subsidies and have led to a groundswell of calls for their reform so that they 
are better engineered to address the home affordability concerns of 
prospective low and middle income homebuyers.10 
As this article will contend, the homeowner subsidies are problematic in 
another way that has attracted much less attention. While homeowner 
decisions can benefit those other than the homeowner, so too can they 
impose costs on others (“negative externalities”11). For example, a steady 
exodus of prospective home buyers from less affluent communities to more 
affluent and exclusive ones can decimate income tax bases and property 
values in the less affluent communities, making the marginalized 
populations left behind financially and otherwise much worse off. Home 
                                                                                                                 
 4 See U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD’s Proposed 2017 Budget (2017), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PROPOSEDFY17FACTSHEET.PDF. 
 5 A positive externality occurs when one party’s actions make another party better off, 
but the first party is not compensated for causing this benefit. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, 
PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 128 (4th ed. 2013). 
 6 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage 
Interest Deduction 22-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002.). 
 7 See infra Part III. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 A negative externality occurs when one party’s actions make another party worse off, 
but the first party does not bear the cost of doing so. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 5, at 124. 
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purchases in newly built developments on greenspace far away from urban 
job centers can heighten damage to the environment, harming both present 
and future generations, through increased carbon emissions, decreased 
biodiversity, and watershed destruction. 
Just as a housing decision might have positive and negative 
consequences for others (“housing externalities”), so are federal policies 
related to housing concerned with more than simply its availability. To 
varying degrees and at considerable expense, federal policies act to contain 
or offset negative housing externalities, especially those that impose 
significant or concentrated costs on others.12 These policies are wide-
ranging and evolving, and include: (i) ameliorating blight, deterioration and 
public health threats in disinvested communities, (ii) decreasing economic 
and racial housing segregation, and (iii) lessening environmental 
degradation that results from housing choices, while reducing the 
vulnerability of those who reside in environmental hotspots.13 
The problem is that the homeowner subsidies are profoundly 
disconnected from these other policies and the negative housing 
externalities they seek to contain. The homeowner subsidies are facially 
neutral with respect to the location and type of home one lives in, rewarding 
homeownership decisions at large (assuming that a homeowner is affluent 
enough to benefit from them).14 So, the subsidies do not aid in ameliorating 
these negative housing externalities, each of which bears some relationship 
to homeowner decisions about home location and type. Furthermore, as this 
article will explain, the subsidies actually encourage to some degree 
homeowner decisions that exacerbate these externalities.15 In other words, 
the government pays for housing consumption that, at best, does little to 
support and, at worst, actually undermines several of its other key housing 
related policies. 
Why the disconnect? Homeowner decisions are complex. So is the 
nation’s housing market, which actually consists of thousands of much 
smaller local markets and submarkets that vary, sometimes dramatically, in 
their strengths and weaknesses. The homeowner subsidies, on the other 
hand, are simplistic and monolithic. This article offers three explanations 
for this design: an idealization of homeownership, administrative 
simplicity, and political intransigence.16 The end result is that the 
homeowner subsidies have come to operate like entitlements, reserved 
primarily for higher income homeowners, rather than strategic investments 
                                                                                                                 
 12 See infra Part IV. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See infra Part V. 
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capable of advancing multiple housing objectives. Meanwhile, lacking a 
demand-side supplement capable of meaningfully influencing homeowner 
behavior, federal policies meant to address negative housing externalities 
reflect a half-hearted, crisis management mentality rather than proactively 
seeking to contain them. 
In addition to shining a light on this disconnect, this article explores 
whether “smarter” homeowner subsidies might be devised to lessen it.17 
Assuming that Congress chooses to continue financially inducing American 
households to own homes, it seems sensible to ask whether Congress can 
leverage these inducements to simultaneously encourage choices that 
impose fewer costs on others. As a starting point, this article offers a 
definition of smarter subsidies as those that are more precisely targeted, 
externality sensitive, and capable of adaptation across multiple housing 
submarkets. It then looks for lessons from the body of public finance 
research that has emerged on the experiences of state and local government 
in targeting demand-side tax subsidies to contain similar types of negative 
externalities.18 Although success has been mixed and criticism plentiful, 
this article draws from the research that when these types of subsidies are 
tailored, limited, variable, and complementary, they can be successful and 
impactful. 
Based on these qualities, this article identifies and scrutinizes three 
different conceptual legal models for smarter federal homeowner 
subsidies.19 These models are: (i) creating a national map of subsidy 
eligible and ineligible zones based on the relationship between homeowner 
behavior in those zones and the reduction of negative housing externalities; 
(ii) offering a collection of a la carte subsidies, each rewarding a specific 
type of homeowner decision; and (iii) allocating subsidies on a community-
by-community or project-by- project basis to support community housing 
plans and public sector programs that address prescribed negative housing 
externalities. It is important to emphasize that none of these models need 
work to the exclusion of improving the performance of homeowner 
subsidies in making homeownership more affordable. Again, the very 
question this article grapples with is whether it is possible to engineer the 
subsidies to simultaneously accomplish multiple housing policy objectives. 
Each of these models has advantages, but presents challenges, not least 
of which follows from trying to accomplish multiple objectives across 
thousands of different U.S. housing markets.20 At the same time, the article 
calls attention to the recent revolution in the quality, quantity, and 
                                                                                                                 
 17 See infra Part VI. 
 18 See infra Part VI.B. 
 19 See infra Part VI.C. 
 20 See infra Part VI.D. 
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accessibility of housing market and property specific real estate data, which 
is fueling a significant uptick in the sophistication of land use planning at 
the community level. Those advances may be the best reason to think that 
smarter federal homeowner subsidies are attainable. 
This article closes by suggesting a path forward.21 Congress should 
approve a HUD-administered pilot program for targeted homeowner 
subsidies using the third model, and through it foster community level 
innovation to identify models that are replicable throughout the country. 
Considering the significant political and practical challenges to undertaking 
immediate and wholescale reform of the current homeowner subsidies, a 
more gradual, less expensive, and pilot-based strategy should also make 
adoption by Congress more likely. For several practical reasons, and a 
potential constitutional one, a program like this probably belongs outside of 
the federal tax code. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a short overview of the 
three principal homeowner subsidies. Part III summarizes criticism of the 
subsidies as to the principal rationale for their existence—encouraging and 
expanding access to homeownership. Part IV examines the subsidies 
through a different lens by identifying the negative housing externalities 
that other federal housing-related policies seek to combat and the complete 
disconnect between the subsidies and containing or offsetting these 
externalities. Part V introduces the concept of smarter subsidies and 
explains why the current subsidies miss the mark. Part VI explores in depth 
how smarter homeowner subsidies might be devised. It examines what 
research has revealed about the effectiveness of selectively available, 
demand-side subsidies at the state and local levels, how this might be 
reflected in the design of federal homeowner subsidies, and the recent 
advances in real estate data and analytics that may make this feasible. Part 
VII closes with this article’s proposal for a path forward. 
II. TAX CODE’S PRINCIPAL HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES 
This article focuses on the three principal tax breaks that the federal 
income tax code provides directly to homeowners—the mortgage interest 
deduction, the property tax deduction, and the exclusion from taxable 
income of capital gain on home sales. The tax code contains other subsidies 
for homeowners, but none are nearly as expensive nor as broadly utilized as 
these three.22 For ease of reference, this article uses the term “homeowner 
subsidies” to mean just these three subsidies. 
                                                                                                                 
 21 See infra Part VI.E. 
 22 See Benjamin H. Harris, C. Eugene Steuerle & Amanda Eng, New Perspectives on 
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It is also worth noting that the U.S. income tax system provides 
homeowners a fourth substantial tax break by not taxing the imputed net 
rental income that results from them living in their own homes. Because the 
notion of taxing imputed home rental income is viewed as administratively 
very difficult, politically perilous, and inconsistent with how the tax code 
treats other imputed rental income, this article does not include it.23 
As background, below are basic overviews of the three principal 
subsidies. 
A. Mortgage Interest Deduction 
Generally speaking, Section 163(h)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(the “Code”) allows homeowners to deduct the interest they pay on their 
home mortgages from taxable income.24 The mortgage interest deduction 
(the “MID”) is an exception to the general rule that taxpayers may not 
deduct interest on personal debt (i.e. debt not attributable to a trade or 
business, or investment activity).25 It is the largest of the homeowner 
subsidies. Congress estimates that the MID alone will cost the federal 
government $63.6 billion in forgone tax revenue in 2017.26 
As with most deductions, the MID is subject to numerous statutory 
clarifications. Most of these are included in the definition of “qualified 
residence interest,” which provides the actual parameters on what is 
deductible.27 Qualified residence interest includes interest on debt up to 
$1,000,000 that is secured by a qualified residence and that is used to 
acquire, construct, or substantially improve the residence (“acquisition 
indebtedness”).28 It also includes interest on up to $100,000 in “home 
equity indebtedness,” which is debt secured by a qualified residence and 
                                                                                                                 
Homeownership Tax Incentives, TAX NOTES, Dec. 23, 2013, at 1315, 1317, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001710-New-
Perspectives-on-Homeownership-Tax-Incentives.pdf (identifying the cost of the three 
principal homeowner tax incentives in 2013 as $121.3 billion as compared to $7.8 billion for 
the cost of the Code’s eight other housing related tax expenditures). Examples of other tax 
code homeowner subsidies include the deduction for premiums for qualified mortgage 
insurance and the exclusion of income attributable to the discharge of principal residence 
acquisition indebtedness. 
 23 See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Imputed Rental Income: Reality Trumps Theory, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN TAX LAW: A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 65 (Anthony C. Infanti ed., 2015). 
 24 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2017). 
 25 Id. § 163(h). 
 26 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32. 
 27 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2017). 
 28 Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii). The limitation if the taxpayer is a married individual filing a 
separate return is $500,000. 
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used for any other purpose.29 “Qualified residence” means the taxpayer’s 
principal residence, as well as up to one additional home the taxpayer uses 
as a residence (e.g. a vacation or weekend home).30 
An important feature of the MID is that it is an itemized deduction.31 
This imposes some very significant limitations on who can claim it. First, in 
order to take any deduction, a person must have taxable income from which 
to subtract the deduction.32 Many U.S. households fall below the income 
thresholds for paying any federal income tax and, thus, cannot utilize the 
MID.33 Second, because the Code automatically provides all taxpayers with 
a standard deduction that can be taken in lieu of itemized deductions, an 
itemized deduction is only worthwhile to those taxpayers whose total 
itemized deductions exceed their standard deduction.34 For that reason, only 
about 30% of taxpayers itemize, most of whom are in the top income 
brackets.35 
At the very high end of the income spectrum, the total amount of 
itemized deductions a taxpayer can claim is gradually reduced pursuant to 
what is commonly known as the Pease limitation.36 The likelihood of the 
Pease limitation making the mortgage interest deduction entirely worthless, 
however, is virtually non-existent for all but the very richest of itemizers 
who would seek to claim it.37 
                                                                                                                 
 29 Id. §163(h)(3)(C). Additional limitations apply to the definition of home equity 
indebtedness. It cannot exceed the difference between the fair market value of the home 
minus the acquisition indebtedness on the home. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). In the case of a 
separate return filed by a married individual, the limitation on home equity indebtedness for 
which interest is deductible is $50,000. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
 30 Id. § 163(h)(4)(A). 
 31 See id. § 63(d). 
 32 See id. § 63(a). 
 33 Approximately 43% of the population, many of whom are lower income, did not owe 
any federal income taxes for 2013. Roberton Williams, Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, 
TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/resources/video-who-
doesnt-pay-federal-taxes. 
 34 See 26 U.S.C. § 63(c) (2017). 
 35 SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43012, ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR 
INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43012.pdf. 
 36 26 U.S.C. § 68 (2017). 
 37 For fiscal year 2016, the Pease limitation only applied to taxpayers with an adjusted 
gross income (AGI) of more than $311,300 if married filing jointly or $259,400 if single (the 
“baseline”). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE 2016, FOR INDIVIDUALS 205 (2016). Most 
taxpayers affected by the Pease limitation see their itemized deductions reduced by 3% of 
the difference between the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income and this baseline. See 26 
U.S.C.S. § 68(a)(1) (2017). 
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B. Property Tax Deduction 
The Code also allows homeowners to deduct property taxes assessed on 
their homes from taxable income. The real property tax deduction is part of 
a broader deduction that the Code allows for most taxes a taxpayer must 
pay to state and local governments, which this article will refer to by its 
commonly known acronym “SALT” (deduction for State and Local 
Taxes).38 Congress estimates that the real property tax deduction 
component of SALT will cost the federal government $33.3 billion in 
forgone tax revenue in 2017.39 
Carved out of SALT are taxes assessed against a particular property for a 
benefit understood to increase that property’s value, like the installation of a 
sidewalk or an irrigation system on that property.40 But, so long as the real 
property tax is levied for the general public welfare, the taxpayer may 
deduct it.41 
As with the mortgage interest deduction, SALT is an itemized deduction, 
and thus only claimed by those who have federal taxable income and also 
have enough qualifying expenses to make itemizing deductions 
worthwhile.42 SALT may also be reduced for high income taxpayers by the 
Pease limitation, though as with the MID, this is only even potentially an 
issue for very high income households.43 
SALT is potentially reducible in another way, which for the most part 
does not apply to the MID.44 SALT is added back into taxable income when 
a taxpayer is subject to the Code’s alternative minimum tax (“AMT”).45 
The AMT is a parallel income tax system that applies an alternative tax rate 
to a broader base of income of a wealthier taxpayer whose taxable income 
under the normal rules has been so reduced by exemptions and deductions 
that her effective tax rate has reached an unacceptable level.46 About 5% of 
                                                                                                                 
 38 26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2017) (identifying “state and local, and foreign, real property 
taxes” as includable within the deduction). 
 39 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32. 
 40 26 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2017); 26 C.F.R. § 1.164-4(a) (2017). 
 41 See 26 C.F.R. 1.164-3(b) (2017). 
 42 See 26 U.S.C. § 63(d) (2017). 
 43 See Williams, supra note 33. 
 44 The alternative minimum tax does not apply to amounts deducted as acquisition 
indebtedness, which is the more substantial component of the MID. See 26 U.S.C. § 56(e) 
(2017). Interest on home equity indebtedness is, however, added back in to taxable income 
when calculating the AMT. 
 45 Id. § 55. 
 46 NORTON FRANCIS ET AL., TAX POL’Y CTR. BRIEFING BOOK (Peter Passell et al. eds., 
2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-deduction-state-and-local-
taxes-work. (ebook). 
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taxpayers are subject to the AMT,47 and it is good bet that many of them see 
the value of their SALT deduction reduced.48 Nevertheless, this is far less 
than the total percentage of taxpayers claiming SALT, which is virtually all 
itemizers.49 
C. Exclusion of Capital Gain on Home Sales 
Section 121 of the Code also allows homeowners to exclude from federal 
income tax up to $250,000 (or $500,000 if married and filing jointly) of the 
gain they realize when selling their principal residences.50 Forgoing tax on 
this income will cost the federal government an estimated $32.1 billion in 
2017. 51 
Certain qualifications apply, of course. A taxpayer can use this exclusion 
no more than once every two years.52 Also, generally speaking, the taxpayer 
must have owned and used the home in question as her principal residence 
for at least two of the five years prior to sale; there are, however, several 
statutory permutations of this requirement to address circumstances like 
subsequent marriages, spouses residing in separate homes, time spent in 
uniformed services, etc.53 
As an exclusion from income rather than a deduction, Section 121 
applies more broadly than a deduction. Most home sellers benefit from it. 
This is because the gain, subject to the monetary limits identified above, is 
not calculated as part of taxable income in the first place, and therefore is 
not subject to the limitations imposed on itemized deductions. For the same 
reason, it is not subject to offset by the Pease limitation or the AMT. 
                                                                                                                 
 47 T17-0149—Characteristics of Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) Payers, 2016 – 2018 
and 2027, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-
estimates/baseline-alternative-minimum-tax-amt-tables-april-2017/t17-0149-characteristics. 
 48 FRANCIS, ET AL., supra note 46. 
 49 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 2 
(2008). 
 50 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2017). 
 51 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32. It is worth a reminder here that 
the tax revenue gained from eliminating Section 121, in particular, would fall short of the tax 
revenue currently forgone. It is reasonable to expect that fewer home sales would occur 
without the home sale capital gain exclusion. See id. 
 52 26 U.S.C. § 121(b)(3) (2017). 
 53 Id. § 121. 
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III. RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSIDIES TO ENCOURAGING AND EXPANDING 
ACCESS TO HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Judging by their origins, the homeowner subsidies are a motley crew. 
The mortgage interest deduction originates from a provision in the nation’s 
original income tax code that at one time made interest on all personal debt 
deductible.54 The property tax deduction is part of the broader deduction for 
most state and local taxes, which is available to homeowners and non-
homeowners alike and is arguably separately justified as shielding 
taxpayers from the apparent inequity of paying income tax on dollars they 
must pay in taxes.55 Even the exclusion of home sale capital gains did not 
originate from a global effort to promote homeownership. Rather, it came 
about piecemeal, through gradual accretion to the notion that gains realized 
on the sale of one’s home can bring about large, untimely, and 
administratively challenging tax burdens, and that trying to relieve this tax 
only in certain circumstances causes distortions in the behavior of other 
homeowners and creates inequities.56 
Origins notwithstanding, all three subsidies are now commonly justified 
as encouraging homeownership. The mortgage interest deduction survived 
the 1986 overhaul of the Code, when Congress repealed the rest of the 
personal debt interest deduction, because proponents spun it as essential to 
preserving the American Dream of homeownership.57 SALT has been the 
object of multiple unsuccessful repeal efforts, and in each case Congress 
has considered carving out the property tax deduction component, in 
recognition of its link to homeownership.58 And the periodic expansions of 
the home sale capital gains exclusion clearly would not have been possible 
without the understanding that homeownership, as a form of saving and 
investment, was something Congress sought to promote. Year after year, 
                                                                                                                 
 54 This deduction may have resulted from Congress wishing to save taxpayers from what 
was then perceived as the difficult task of distinguishing between personal and profit-
seeking debt. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and 
Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (2010). 
 55 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 410 (Foundation, 7th ed. 2013). 
 56 See generally Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 187 (2013). 
 57 See Ventry, Jr., supra note 54. 
 58 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2116. See also, Aaron 
Lorenzo & Rachel Bade, First GOP Tax Reform Feud Erupts Over State, Local Tax Break, 
POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/28/gop-tax-reform-feud-
state-local-tax-break-243285. 
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Congress reports all three subsidies as housing expenditures, making no 
secret of what it believes they are meant to do.59 
There is some irony then in the significant doubt cast on the link between 
the homeowner subsidies and encouraging or expanding access to 
homeownership. The MID, perhaps because it is the largest of the subsidies, 
has received the greatest scrutiny. Most strikingly, several policy experts 
have proclaimed that the MID has had no discernible effect on the 
homeownership rate.60 Viewed over a half century, the American 
homeownership rate has remained relatively constant, even though the 
value of the MID has fluctuated significantly at times, indicating that an 
increased level of MID subsidy doesn’t cause a greater percentage of 
Americans to become homeowners.61 
This is not to say that the MID has no impact on home-buying decisions. 
In fact, numerous studies have shown that the MID does increase the 
amount Americans spend on housing.62 But its primary impact is on high-
income households who increase their housing consumption by buying 
larger and more expensive homes than they might have otherwise.63 These 
are households that would likely already buy homes and thus don’t need 
subsidies to encourage them to do so.64 Low and middle income 
households, which are those likely to be on the fence between renting and 
buying a home, are by comparison largely unaffected by the MID.65 
                                                                                                                 
 59 See 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3. 
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 64 Hanson, supra note 62; Horpedahl & Searles, supra note 62. See also, ERIC TODER, ET 
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http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28666/412099-reforming-the-mortgage-
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 65 Id. 
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The explanation for why the MID produces these results is no great 
mystery and has received considerable attention. The MID is a classic 
example of an upside-down subsidy. As discussed in Part II, the only 
homeowners who can take advantage of the MID are those who have 
taxable liability to offset and have sufficient qualifying expenses (mortgage 
interest, income taxes, charitable contributions, etc.) to make itemizing 
deductions worthwhile, as opposed to taking the standard deduction.66 
These requirements alone make nearly all of the lower two income quintiles 
of American households ineligible for the MID and leaves only roughly 
30% of taxpayers, primarily those in the upper two income quintiles, as 
potential claimants.67 
Furthermore, even among claimants, tax-code deductions are 
significantly more valuable to higher-income taxpayers than they are to 
middle and lower income taxpayers. This is partly due to the fact that a 
taxpayer’s income is not taxed at a uniform rate, but rather at a series of 
escalating marginal rates that increase as a taxpayer’s income increases.68 
The value of a deduction depends on the rate at which the deducted income 
would have been taxed. To illustrate, a married couple (filing jointly) with 
$280,000 in taxable income and $10,000 in deductible mortgage interest 
reduces their taxable income to $270,000, which is income taxed at 33%.69 
Accordingly, they receive a tax reduction of $3,300. An otherwise identical 
couple with $70,000 in taxable income also deducts $10,000, but gets a tax 
reduction of only $1,500 because this income is in the 15% tax bracket.70 
Add to this that higher income households own more expensive homes and 
so usually have larger mortgages and more mortgage interest to deduct, and 
it is little wonder that the lion’s share of the benefits from the MID go to 
high income households.71 
Although it has received less isolated scrutiny than the MID, the property 
tax component of SALT has similar consequences.72 This is because SALT 
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is nearly identical in design to the MID and likewise an upside-down 
subsidy. Unsurprisingly, its benefits also inure disproportionately to those 
who have higher income and it is much less valuable to homeowners who 
have less income.73 
The exclusion of home sale capital gains is a different animal than the 
deductions. But the benefits of this subsidy also flow primarily to higher 
income individuals. First, households in the 15% tax bracket and below pay 
no capital gains tax and, thus, receive no benefit from this subsidy.74 For 
those not automatically exempt from this tax, marginal tax brackets play 
less of a role than with MID and SALT, since most taxpayers pay tax on 
capital gains at a rate of 15%.75 However, those with very high incomes 
would pay capital gains tax at a 20% rate and so the break is larger at the 
high end of the income scale.76 Furthermore, wealthier taxpayers tend to 
own more expensive homes, which, all other factors equal, generate larger 
gain.77 Finally, wealthier homeowners tend to live in more exclusive and 
wealthier neighborhoods, where home values appreciate at greater rates and 
so, again, receive larger amounts of tax-free gain upon re-sale.78 
Not only are the homeowner subsidies by design primarily beneficial to 
upper income households, they actually tend to inflate home prices, 
particularly in areas where housing supply is limited, and thus, 
paradoxically, often reduce home affordability. Several economists have 
studied whether the MID, in particular, reduces the cost of homeownership 
for prospective home buyers or is anticipated by the housing market and 
simply absorbed (“capitalized”) into higher home prices.79 The answer 
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appears to be that it depends. Where the supply of housing is limited, due to 
a combination of regulations that hamper construction and geographic 
factors, and housing demand is high, home prices fully capitalize the 
subsidy.80 So the subsidy does not act to lower homeownership costs and 
instead increases the bar for lower income, down payment constrained 
households entering the market in those places where they most need a 
subsidy.81 
In markets with lax land use regulations, fewer geographic barriers, 
and/or lower demand, the MID is not fully capitalized and does reduce 
homeownership costs.82 But, as explained above, even in these areas the 
MID inures primarily to the benefit of high income households who would 
likely already purchase a home and, therefore, does not really improve 
homeownership attainment.83 
In sum, as it relates to increasing homeownership opportunities, the track 
record of the homeowner subsidies is abysmal. It is more accurate to say 
that the subsidies reward the homeownership investments of certain 
homeowners, most of whom need no incentive to become homeowners, 
than to say that the subsidies encourage or expand access to 
homeownership. 
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSIDIES TO NEGATIVE HOUSING 
EXTERNALITIES AND RELATED POLICIES 
The homeowner subsidies are problematic in another way that has drawn 
significantly less attention. Decisions as to where and in what type of home 
a household lives have consequences not only for that household, but the 
surrounding community and society at large. The benefits to and costs on 
others that result from homeowner decisions can be thought of as a category 
of “housing externalities.” To some degree and at considerable expense, the 
federal government intervenes through policies it adopts to contain or offset 
negative housing externalities, especially those that impose significant or 
concentrated costs on others. 
As this Part will demonstrate, the homeowner subsidies, at best, provide 
very little support to these other housing related policies. At worst, they 
actually exacerbate the negative externalities that the policies try to contain 
and, in this sense, undermine these policies. Moreover, in the absence of a 
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demand-side supplement capable of meaningfully encouraging homeowner 
behavior that reduces negative housing externalities, the policies 
themselves are not very effective. This Part identifies several categories of 
negative housing externalities, the conditions that give rise to them, the 
federal policies that seek to contain them and their relationship (or, in 
actuality, the lack thereof) with the current homeowner subsidies. 
A. Ameliorating Blight, Deterioration, and Public Health Threats in 
Disinvested Communities 
1. Background 
Communities throughout the country grapple with the collateral damage 
that results from chronic disinvestment.84 Community disinvestment is a 
process by which residents, businesses, and other financially mobile 
economic actors extricate themselves from a community they perceive as 
deteriorating and too risky in which to invest capital, leading to further 
decline and, in some cases, large-scale abandonment.85 
Illustrative of this phenomenon is the now familiar story of Midwestern 
and Northeastern “legacy” cities.86 These are places where industry and 
manufacturing once flourished and supported thriving residential 
communities.87 Persistent adverse economic forces subsequently turned the 
tide in these cities, causing the loss of many large employers and good 
paying jobs, lowering the overall standard of living, and stemming 
population growth.88 As their economic fortunes turned for the worse, other 
forms of capital also fled. Highways, readily available mortgages, and a 
quest for greener, roomier, and more homogenous communities catalyzed 
the flight of more affluent residents, often times to newly-created suburbs 
just beyond the boundaries of legacy cities.89 As more financially mobile 
residents left and new ones have looked elsewhere, stores have shuttered, 
community institutions like hospitals and schools have closed or 
consolidated, and banks have stopped lending.90 Compounded over time, 
these decisions can dramatically shrink a legacy city’s income base and 
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decrease its property values, meaning local government receives less tax 
revenue and struggles to provide basic services. At the same time, 
sustaining an economically needier community and aging infrastructure 
increases the demands on government. 
Left unchecked, disinvestment can cause a full-fledged, downward 
community spiral, spurring the remaining mobile capital to leave, 
overwhelming local resources and accelerating physical deterioration. 
Those residents who cannot afford to leave are left behind. More recently, 
older suburbs closest to the urban cores of legacy cities are encountering the 
next wave of disinvestment as developers and economically mobile 
homebuyers push out one ring farther to brand new suburbs and exurbs, or 
selectively re-populate more trendy sections of urban cores.91 
This pattern of historically short periods of community settlement, 
expansion and abandonment in legacy cities is only one narrative (albeit a 
common one) of community disinvestment in the United States. A bird’s 
eye view of the country reveals the wide-spread prevalence of disinvesting 
and disinvested communities, often within close proximity of communities 
that are prospering.92 By one measurement, 22.1% of U.S. census tracts 
have significantly depressed property values and predominantly low income 
populations, which are hallmarks of community disinvestment.93 So-called 
“middle neighborhoods” constitute another large category of communities 
that are less distressed at this point, but sit on the precipice of disinvestment 
due to their increasingly poorer and older populations, and aging housing 
stock.94 
The physical condition of housing stock is a particularly visible and 
jarring manifestation of the consequences and costs of community 
disinvestment. Disinvested communities must manage increasing stockpiles 
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of outdated, orphaned, devalued, and deteriorating homes. Direct costs 
associated with these properties include increased code enforcement, 
boarding, property maintenance (grass and trash), fire and police runs, and, 
ultimately, when they have reached an advanced stage of decay, 
demolitions.95 Meanwhile, local government loses property tax revenue 
necessary to cover the direct costs as these properties deteriorate and lose 
value, the owners stop paying the taxes altogether, and/or the structures on 
them are demolished.96 Then, there is the negative spillover effect that 
vacant and deteriorating homes have on the values of surrounding homes, 
which not only further reduces property tax revenue for the city, but also 
depletes the wealth of neighbors, sometimes dramatically.97 
At work is severe market failure. Disinvestment decisions drive down 
property values to the point that they can no longer support private 
investment. Remaining homeowners hesitate to make improvements to their 
homes out of a concern they will not recoup these investments.98 
Developers, lenders, and prospective home buyers view rehabbing viable 
homes or demolishing and replacing those that are blighted as cost 
prohibitive or too risky, and so new capital also dries up.99 
The costs of supporting flailing housing markets typically prove too 
much for local actors to bear alone, and the federal government steps in. In 
1965, Congress created a cabinet level agency, the U.S. Department of 
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD), largely as a response to 
disinvestment in U.S. cities and a heightening concern for those left to live 
in them.100 While HUD has overseen an alphabet soup of different 
programs over a half century, its longest standing and primary program for 
addressing disinvestment is the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program.101 Through CDBG, HUD annually transfers billions of 
federal dollars to cities, urban counties, and states, much of which goes to 
trying to stabilize and revitalize their disinvested housing markets.102 
Eligible expenses include strategic property acquisition, housing 
construction and rehabilitation, housing code enforcement, and community 
planning.103 
Ultimately, however, the amount of assistance HUD provides is small 
compared to the scope of the problem.104 Furthermore, CDBG rules 
effectively restrict funding to areas with high poverty and, thus, already 
highly distressed housing markets; in so doing, these rules exclude 
communities that are starting to deteriorate, but where intervention could 
enable a turnaround.105 This is emblematic of the crisis-management 
mentality the federal government takes to disinvestment. This mentality 
was further exemplified by the Congressional response to communities hit 
hardest during the country’s recent foreclosure crisis, a disinvestment event 
of mammoth proportions. Congress approved over $7 billion in 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds, administered through CDBG, 
over a five year period to try and stop the most severe bleeding in housing 
markets afflicted by concentrated numbers of foreclosures and vacancies.106 
But it refused to extend the program beyond this point, even though few of 
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the communities funded had begun to show signs of a meaningful 
turnaround.107 
To this point, this section has focused on the housing market dysfunction 
that follows from community disinvestment, while ignoring the associated 
human costs. These are in fact quite staggering. Older communities with 
large numbers of distressed and vacant residential properties have 
remarkably higher incidences of public health issues, like lead paint 
poisoning among children,108 asthma,109 chronic health conditions,110 and 
other environmental hazards.111 They also correlate strongly with higher 
incidences of violent crime.112 Local governments rely on a stable 
residential tax base to fund critical infrastructure like school systems, water 
line maintenance, sewage and storm water systems, road repair, and public 
transit. When tax revenue shrinks, all of these suffer.113 
The federal government routinely directs billions of dollars annually to 
communities struggling to meet these types of costs through a wide array of 
programs.114 Again, it is also the ultimate backstop when a crisis that traces 
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back to disinvestment arises. As simply one example, cost-cutting to meet 
municipal general fund shortfalls, recently resulted in contamination of the 
water supply of Flint, Michigan, long viewed as a poster child for urban 
disinvestment. With the city teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, Congress 
stepped in with $120 million to help replace lead water supply lines in all of 
Flint’s homes and to make an initial down payment on the long-term health 
issues expected from the widespread lead poisoning of the city’s residents 
that occurred.115 
This is to say nothing of the considerable dollars Congress has spent or 
forgone in attempts to revitalize disinvested communities through economic 
development. These initiatives have varied from decade to decade and 
included Empowerment Zones, Enterprise and Renewal Communities, and 
New Market Tax Credits.116 For the most part, they have sought to leverage 
federal grants and tax breaks to attract private capital to invest in businesses 
in distressed neighborhoods in order to put local residents to work and 
spark community reinvestment.117 
2.  Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies 
As some of the federal interventions described above suggest, what 
disinvestment has wrought, the reinvestment of private dollars could help 
remedy. An influx of new homeowners would reduce stockpiles of vacant 
structures, invest capital in rehabilitated or new homes, increase tax 
revenue, and, by extension, offset negative housing externalities associated 
with disinvestment.118 This has proven to be the case in communities 
throughout the country where disinvestment wrecked less damage and some 
combination of market dynamics and forward looking policies created the 
right mix of circumstances for reinvestment to occur.119 It is also the 
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philosophy Congress has adhered to in creating federal tax breaks for 
businesses to locate in disinvested communities. 
And yet the homeowner subsidies are, at least on their face, entirely 
neutral in this regard. They reward an investment in homeownership 
equally no matter where it occurs, whether it is in a thriving residential 
market or one that is highly disinvested. The result is that although the 
federal government absorbs significant costs in containing damage to and 
ostensibly laying the foundation for housing market recoveries in 
disinvested communities, its primary mechanisms for encouraging 
households to invest in homes do nothing to encourage prospective 
homebuyers to purchase there. 
Furthermore, although facially neutral, the reality is that the subsidies to 
a large extent support homeowners who live in affluent, non-disinvested 
communities. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the geographic 
distribution of the subsidies is strongly tilted towards areas where housing 
prices, income levels, and homeownership rates are high120—the hallmarks 
of a healthy housing market. This is unsurprising considering the design of 
the subsidies. Home sale gains are more likely to occur (and in greater 
amounts) in robust housing markets, and, therefore, the savings yielded by 
excluding them from capital gains tax will also be greater.121 Also, home 
prices are higher in stronger housing markets. Those with the most 
expensive homes not only are likely to have larger mortgages and higher 
property taxes, but also sit in higher marginal tax brackets and, therefore, 
receive a greater tax benefit for each dollar of mortgage interest and 
property tax they deduct. 
Conversely, homeowners in disinvested communities will, generally 
speaking, have lower mortgage interest and property tax costs (due to the 
lower values of their homes), sit in lower marginal tax brackets, and yield 
smaller gains upon selling their homes, and, thus, yield less benefit from the 
homeowner subsidies. An exception to this rule exists for those who own 
more expensive homes in disinvested communities that have higher local 
property tax rates due to greater municipal costs. In this way, the property 
tax deduction may alleviate a barrier to homeownership in disinvested 
communities. But this subsidy is not designed to achieve this end and so its 
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impact on housing markets in disinvested communities is largely incidental 
and much less than it could be. The reality is that homes are typically worth 
less in disinvested communities and fewer residents are affluent enough to 
itemize their deductions, making the property tax deduction relatively much 
less valuable for homeowners in these communities than in more affluent 
communities. 
The bottom line is that the homeowner subsidies do relatively little to 
encourage homeowners to invest in disinvested communities. While this 
again is unsurprising based on how deductions and exclusions operate, it 
seems difficult to justify a system in which the vast majority of the 
homeowner subsidies incentivize home purchases in housing markets that 
function well and in which the private market already rewards homeowners 
for their purchases, while doing little for struggling markets that present 
large disincentives to purchase and impose significant costs on the public 
sector. This is especially true given that, as Part III demonstrated, the 
subsidies do not even help lower-income households access thriving 
markets and, in fact, probably operate to exclude them. 
To go one step further, the homeowner subsidies probably counteract the 
federal government’s policy of containing the damage in disinvested 
communities by incentivizing higher income taxpayers to leave or stay 
away. This is because the principal impact of the subsidies is to cause these 
types of taxpayers to over-invest in housing by buying larger, more 
expensive homes and in higher income areas than they might otherwise so 
that they can maximize their tax benefits under the subsidies.122 Especially 
when coupled with exclusionary land use restrictions (like large minimum 
lot size requirements) imposed in many high-end developments, the 
subsidies contribute to a form of income-level sorting, attracting more 
affluent prospective homeowners to higher income areas. This squeezes out 
low income entrants and contributes to capital flight and home price losses 
in declining housing markets.123 
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B. Decreasing Economic and Racial Segregation 
1. Background 
Housing in the United States is highly segregated by wealth and race. 
Economic segregation, in particular, is increasing dramatically. The 
percentage of poor households living in high poverty neighborhoods has 
grown from 43% to 54% in just the last 15 years; meanwhile, the 
percentage of high income households living in high income neighborhoods 
has also escalated (from 40% to 49% in the last 25 years).124 These statistics 
are consistent with recent studies revealing that high income households are 
choosing with greater frequency to pay more to live in exclusive 
communities, and with the decrease in the size of the middle class.125 This 
increasing stratification is facilitated by land use restrictions imposed by 
local ordinances and property developers and market-driven forces that 
drive up the cost of housing in affluent communities to the point where it 
effectively bars low income residents. 
Racial segregation in housing is actually declining gradually, but remains 
quite high. A Brookings Institution study based on 2010-2014 census data 
showed that all fifty-two of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas are 
significantly segregated by race.126 This is especially true as it relates to 
black-white segregation. According to one common measurement of 
housing segregation, more than half of all blacks would have to move from 
their current communities to white communities for those communities to 
match the national ratio of white to black residents.127 Racial segregation is 
the legacy of a legal system that for much of the country’s history permitted 
discrimination in housing practices and a culture that has long stigmatized 
differences in race.128 Race-based neighborhood stereotyping continues to 
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be a common practice and an explanation for why many white homebuyers 
choose to avoid or leave neighborhoods with large or growing African-
American populations.129 
Because poverty rates are much higher among African Americans and 
Hispanics than among whites, it is difficult to separate a discussion of 
economic and race segregation.130 Low income neighborhoods in the 
United States have disproportionately high minority populations.131 In fact, 
not only poor African-Americans but all African-Americans are much more 
likely to live in high poverty neighborhoods than their white 
counterparts.132 Perhaps most troubling, 66% of young African-Americans 
live in poor neighborhoods (10 times as many as young whites).133 
Housing segregation imposes severe costs on those who live in high 
poverty communities.134 To a large extent, these communities overlap with 
the disinvested communities discussed in Part IV.A and, thus, face many of 
the same problems. These include smaller tax bases and less private 
investment, resulting in poorer quality housing, institutions, infrastructure, 
and services for their residents.135 High poverty communities also fare 
much worse in terms of safety, environmental quality, and health.136 Part 
IV.A details these negative housing externalities and federal attempts to 
mitigate them. 
Particularly germane to residential segregation and worth separate 
mention here is the opportunity gap, or a lack of access to pathways out of 
poverty, for those isolated in high poverty communities. These pathways 
include well-performing schools, positive role models, access to job 
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opportunities, and examples of success.137 Instead of these pathways, 
residents of communities with concentrated poverty must contend daily 
with unsafe streets, substandard housing conditions, and dysfunctional 
behavior.138 Of foremost concern is the individual personal harm that 
follows. However, it is also important to recognize the resulting societal 
costs that compound over time. These include an increased reliance on 
entitlement programs, and high incarceration rates among residents in these 
communities, which imposes costs on all taxpayers.139 On a macro level, 
high levels of residential isolation inhibit local labor markets, stunting a 
metropolitan area’s economic growth and harming both marginalized and 
non-marginalized residents.140 Spread across multiple metropolitan areas, it 
impairs the country’s ability to compete in a global economy, running 
counter to national interests.141 
As mentioned previously, explaining the costs of racial segregation, 
separate from economic segregation, is more challenging. And yet solid 
evidence exists. For instance, it has long been established that home prices 
and appreciation in predominantly African-American communities lag 
considerably behind homes in predominantly white communities with 
comparable resident income levels.142 This disparity rises with increasing 
levels of segregation.143 Lower home appreciation impairs wealth 
accumulation among African Americans, and the significance of this is 
magnified because the home is more likely to be the primary financial asset 
of an African American household.144 The ripple effect of lower property 
values also manifests in less local tax revenue which negatively impacts 
school funding, educational achievement, and the delivery of public 
services in these communities, which in turn contributes to negative racial 
stereotypes and social polarization. A recent analysis of metropolitan 
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regions across the country demonstrated that a high level of racial 
segregation causes a much lower per capita income for African Americans 
and projected the cost to the Chicago region alone at an estimated $4.4 
billion in annual regional income and more than $8 billion in annual gross 
domestic product.145 
All of this said, federal policy on housing segregation has a complicated 
history. Racial discrimination was at one point the law of the land. Through 
at least the mid-twentieth century, federal agencies adhered to explicitly 
segregationist practices that have left an enduring mark on contemporary 
housing patterns.146 These included, perhaps most notoriously, the Federal 
Housing Administration’s mortgage underwriting standards, which 
prevented African American homeowners from getting mortgages to live in 
white communities, and vice versa, and the Public Works Administration’s 
construction of racially designated public housing projects in 
neighborhoods with matching racial compositions.147 These expressly 
discriminatory policies are fortunately now a relic of the past. Yet, federal 
agencies to this day face criticism that they do not do enough to address less 
overt forms of socioeconomic and racial discrimination in housing 
programs they design.148 
The passage of the Fair Housing Act by Congress in 1968149 was a 
monumental turning point, at least as it relates to express racial 
discrimination. The Act prohibited discrimination in any housing 
transaction based on race150 and charged the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with enforcing the 
Act.151 Of course, prohibiting discrimination and decreasing segregation are 
two different matters. The Act also obligated the HUD Secretary (in 
addition to all federal executive agencies and programs related to housing 
and urban development) to implement programs not just to prevent 
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discrimination against protected classes, but also to “affirmatively [] 
further” fair housing.152 This mandate has proven more elusive. Its 
meaning, as well as how vigorously HUD has pursued it, has varied in the 
years since the Act’s enactment, based in part on who has occupied the 
White House and Congress at the time and the level of opposition mounted 
by private interests regulated by it.153 
Nevertheless, HUD has by and large embraced the mantle of fostering 
more economically and racially inclusive communities as a fundamental 
part of its mission, especially in recent decades. This goal consistently 
appears as a critical plank in HUD’s mission statements and strategic 
plans.154 Moreover, HUD and Congress have adopted some significant 
programs aimed squarely at encouraging residential integration. Perhaps the 
longest standing pro-integrationist program is the Section 8 rental housing 
voucher program which, at least in theory, enables low income voucher 
recipients to move outside their current neighborhoods to find housing.155 In 
1992, Congress authorized the HOPE VI program, a multi-billion dollar, 
two decade long initiative intended to deconcentrate poverty in public 
housing projects by demolishing and replacing many of them with mixed 
income developments.156 Perhaps the most dramatic strides towards 
decreasing residential segregation were made during the Obama 
administration. During this time, HUD enlivened the long-standing 
obligation that all recipients of HUD funding (which includes many state 
and municipal governments) regularly assess the state of fair housing within 
their jurisdictions and report to HUD on their efforts and plans to further it 
as a condition of continued funding.157 The Obama administration also 
introduced a new approach to rental formulas for the Section 8 program 
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aimed at increasing options for voucher holders in more affluent 
neighborhoods.158 
2. Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies 
Homeowner subsidies would seem to be a potentially powerful 
mechanism for alleviating housing segregation. To the extent that 
traditional biases or development financing concerns stand in the way of 
affluent and racially homogenous communities accommodating mixed 
income housing, the carrot of homeowner subsidies could serve as 
meaningful leverage for these communities to decide to become more 
inclusive. Subsidies might also serve as tempting incentives to draw more 
affluent homeowners to less affluent communities, or to attract homeowners 
to a racially homogenous community that would improve its diversity. 
Poorer and racially marginalized communities would, in turn, presumably 
stand to benefit from increased tax bases, improved public services, and an 
overall reduction of the other negative housing externalities that follow 
from concentrated economic and racial isolation. 
As designed, however, the current homeowner subsidies do very little to 
support residential integration. Not only are they facially neutral as to 
where a homeowner purchases, but also as to a prospective homeowner’s 
race, ethnicity, and, at least in theory, income level. Thus, the subsidies do 
not explicitly reward or penalize a homeownership decision that promotes 
integration or enhances segregation. 
Once again, however, the subsidies are also not actually all that neutral in 
terms of their impact. Because by design they inure primarily to the benefit 
of high income homeowners, who are typically found in affluent 
communities with high home prices, they by and large supplement spending 
on homeownership in communities that are inaccessible to lower income 
households (and by extension to the strong majority of minority households 
as well). Conversely, they are not of much value to those lower income 
(and oftentimes minority) households who wish to move from opportunity 
poor to opportunity rich communities.159 
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Stacked on top of this reality is the recognition that the subsidies 
encourage the type of income sorting discussed in Part IV.A, by which 
affluent homebuyers seek to live in higher yield, higher cost communities to 
maximize their tax benefits from the subsidies.160 Accordingly, the 
subsidies probably serve to increase economic segregation. The one 
exception, as described in Part IV.A.2, is the property tax deduction, which 
helps alleviate a barrier to living in communities that have higher taxes due 
to the greater public expenses that follow from serving lower income 
populations in poorer cities. However, any positive benefit that follows 
from this deduction is largely incidental and not a reflection of its design.161 
The homeowner subsidies probably heighten racial segregation for the 
same reasons they heighten economic segregation and another more race 
specific reason as well. As noted earlier, homes in majority African 
American neighborhoods do not appreciate as much as homes in 
predominantly white neighborhoods.162 White prospective home buyers 
recognize this and factor it into their choice of neighborhood.163 From this, 
it is not difficult to extrapolate that many white prospective homeowners 
view predominantly African American neighborhoods or neighborhoods 
with growing black populations as bad places to maximize their homeowner 
subsidies and avoid them. 
C. Lessening Environmental Degradation Resulting from Housing 
Choices, While Reducing Vulnerability of Those Who Reside in 
Environmental Hotspots 
1. Background 
A homeowner’s decisions as to where to live and in what type of home 
affect his or her relationship to the natural environment in a wide and 
complex variety of ways. One example is a home’s carbon footprint. 
Homes are a major source of carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gas) 
emissions, and greenhouse gas emissions are the principal cause of global 
warming.164 A home built with energy efficient materials that is smaller, 
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uses renewable energy, and requires less driving to get to and from a job 
center has a smaller carbon footprint. This type of home harms the 
environment less, all other things being equal, than one that does not use 
these materials, is larger, burns fossil fuels, and is further away. Some other 
examples of environmental conditions impacted by housing choices include 
wetlands protection, habitat and wildlife preservation, fresh and 
groundwater supply, and storm and sewer water management.165 
Not only does housing impact the environment, the environment impacts 
housing. Homes built along coasts and in floodplains are more susceptible 
to damage by severe weather events and rising tides.166 Likewise, homes 
near fault lines, mountains, and forests are more susceptible to damage 
from earthquakes, landslides, and forest fires, respectively. 
Furthermore, housing can impact the environment in ways that in turn 
increase the vulnerability of that housing. Houston’s recent encounter with 
Hurricane Harvey is a telling example. Long recognized as the epitome of 
booming development catalyzed by a lack of land use regulation, housing 
developers in Houston have constructed one low-density, concrete laden 
subdivision after another on top of former prairie.167 At the same time, 
Houston sits close to the Gulf of Mexico exposing it to severe storms, 
which appear to be occurring with greater frequency in vulnerable regions 
due to climate change and rising sea levels.168 By replacing 65 square miles 
of freshwater wetlands with impervious surfaces on which water can 
accumulate, Houston’s housing development patterns have made it much 
more vulnerable to massive flooding.169 This has occurred three times in 
just the last three years, most recently and tragically with Hurricane 
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Harvey, which caused flooding that led to a loss of lives, inundated entire 
neighborhoods and damaged an estimated 200,000 homes.170 
The negative externalities flowing from human behavior that degrades 
the environment, including housing choices, are wide-ranging and 
potentially severe. For example, if greenhouse gas emissions do not slow, 
global warming is expected to raise temperatures worldwide between 2 and 
11.5 degrees Fahrenheit during the 21st century.171 Such an increase is 
projected to raise sea levels, fully or partially submerge certain coastal 
cities, kill off 30% of the world species, increase human disease, decrease 
agricultural productivity, and lead to a dramatic increase in severe weather 
events and a significant impairment of the world population’s overall 
quality of life.172 Accurately pegging the costs imposed by global warming 
is a difficult task because it is forward-looking and involves many 
secondary impacts. Attempts to do so have estimated the price tag to the 
United States as reaching into the trillions of dollars annually if patterns do 
not change.173 Although the economic, health, and social costs may 
potentially be enormous, many will not manifest for decades. This is part of 
why federal efforts to significantly scale back U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions have not succeeded.174 
Federal policies related to housing and the environment reflect this 
inability to gain serious traction. A good example is the federal response to 
suburban sprawl. Sprawl is commonly understood to mean low density, 
minimally controlled, single use residential development that outpaces 
population growth, occurs on urban fringes and is accessible almost 
exclusively by automobile.175 Evidence has mounted in recent years of the 
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many negative environmental externalities resulting from uncontrolled 
sprawl, including the loss of wetlands, increased storm water run-off, 
increased carbon consumption, and the destruction of wildlife habitats.176 
On the one hand, the federal government recognizes sprawl as a significant 
problem.177 Congress has empowered the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate certain aspects of land development particularly 
critical to managing sprawl such as local storm water management and 
wetlands protection.178 The EPA, through its Office of Sustainable 
Communities, encourages local and state planners, through funding and 
educational resources, to implement “Smart Growth” techniques that 
minimize negative environmental impacts in constructing new residential 
communities and re-designing existing ones.179 Other federal agencies, like 
HUD, the Department of Transportation, and FEMA, have recently forged 
partnerships with the EPA to coordinate their housing and infrastructure 
funding to provide more leverage for the construction of environmentally 
sustainable communities.180 
On the other hand, the federal government leaves individual development 
decisions in the hands of state and local governments,181 many of which pay 
no mind to and lack a significant incentive to adopt Smart Growth 
principles. The degree of attention that environmental sustainability 
receives has varied based on who leads the relevant federal departments and 
agencies, which has led to a lack of consistency in policy implementation. 
Furthermore, many have suggested that long-standing, pro-growth policies 
of the federal government, like the construction and expansion of federal 
highways, have been instrumental in encouraging suburban sprawl (a 
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contention that a comprehensive Government Accountability Office study 
on the topic has contested).182 
Meanwhile, federal policy has been clearer and more consistent in 
mitigating the financial risks of those who choose to reside in 
environmental hot spots. Damages homeowners in these places incur due to 
severe weather events become negative housing externalities because of the 
federal government’s long standing policy of providing taxpayer-funded 
disaster relief. For example, Congress and the executive branch have 
typically rushed to the aid of coastal areas hit hardest by hurricanes and 
super storms. This assistance has gone well beyond emergency assistance 
and included helping these higher risk communities rebuild homes and 
homeowners recover financial losses due to home damage.183 The federal 
price tag for storm recovery packages since Hurricane Katrina in 2004 was 
$200 billion prior to Hurricane Harvey.184 Estimates of projected damage 
from Hurricane Harvey alone are in the range of $180 billion, much of 
which the federal government will cover.185  
Part of these federal aid packages cover deficits in the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures homeowners in high flood risk 
areas due to the shortage of private insurance options. NFIP homeowner 
insurance premiums historically run far short of homeowner flood claims, 
resulting in a deficit of between $16 billion and $25 billion for years 2002 
through 2013, which taxpayers ultimately have had to pay.186 More 
recently, Congress has simply started buying out homeowners in high-risk 
coastal communities (termed “climate change refugees”), recognizing that it 
may be cheaper in the long-run to demolish the homes rather than having to 
continually bail them out. Congress has already allocated $1 billion in 
dollars to HUD for home purchase and resettlement programs, and Houston 
is expected to add to the demand.187 
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2. Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies 
As just discussed, certain homeowner choices do greater harm to the 
environment than others, although a significant portion of these negative 
housing externalities will be borne by future generations. Also, certain 
choices place homeowners in more environmentally vulnerable locations, 
and a portion of these costs are incurred more immediately by all taxpayers 
as a result of federal disaster relief policies. The homeowner subsidies 
could serve as one way to discourage those decisions that impose more of 
these negative housing externalities and encourage those that impose less. 
Yet, once again, the homeowner subsidies provide virtually no help. 
Neutral as they are to location and form, they neither encourage nor 
discourage a prospective homeowner’s decisions to, for example, live in a 
community that is near or far from an urban center, public transportation, or 
an environmentally sensitive or vulnerable area, even though these 
decisions vary significantly in the price tag they impose on others. Federal 
policy focuses much more on responding to severe damage that follows 
from environmental and natural catastrophes, than on proactively 
influencing housing decisions that reduce environmental harm or 
susceptibility in the first place. 
Some would go a step further and argue that the subsidies have 
encouraged certain negative externality producing choices like suburban 
sprawl.188 Across almost all metropolitan areas, the benefits of tax subsidies 
are claimed with greater frequency by those living in suburban and exurban 
areas, where lot sizes and home are bigger.189 Homeowners in these areas 
utilize the subsidies not as an incentive to purchase a home, but rather as an 
incentive to purchase a bigger home on a larger lot.190 Accordingly, these 
studies contend that a primary effect of the subsidies has been the 
construction of larger, “McMansion” style homes that are an average of 250 
to 1000 square feet larger than necessary.191 
At the same time, it should be noted that federal tax policy has recently 
made some inroads in encouraging greater energy efficiency in homes, 
although they are often marketed primarily as ways to cut consumer energy 
                                                                                                                 
COMMUNITIES OPT FOR MANAGED RETREAT 26 (Lincoln Inst., 2016). 
 188 See, e.g., Andrew Hanson, Ike Brannon & Zackary Hawley, Rethinking Tax Benefits 
for Home Owners, 19 NAT’L AFF. 40 (2014). 
 189 Id. at 45. Interestingly, this outcome conflicts with one of the objectives of the 1997 
tax code amendments in the treatment of the home sale capital gain exclusion, which was to 
eliminate the incentive the previous rules provided to “buy up” to avoid the capital gain tax. 
See, e.g., Biehl & Hoyt, supra note 122. 
 190 Id. at 47-48. 
 191 Id. at 48-49.   
238 University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1 
bills rather than as reducing negative housing externalities. Congress has 
passed an array of tax incentives for home-builders, home appliance 
makers, and consumers aimed at spurring the supply of and demand for 
energy efficient homes and home products.192 For homeowners, these have 
taken the form of federal income tax credits for the purchase of energy 
efficient appliances, certain home improvements that increase energy 
efficiency, and the installation of renewable energy systems.193 Sustained 
commitment to the homeowner subsidies has been relatively weak, 
however. The homeowner energy tax credits have been small and subject to 
low overall caps, raising concerns that they did not act as much of an 
incentive.194 Most of the credits recently expired, and there appears to be 
little political will in Congress to renew them. 
V.  UNDERSTANDING THE DISCONNECT (HOW AND WHY CURRENT 
HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES ARE NOT SMART) 
As Part IV demonstrated, a striking disconnect exists between the 
homeowner subsidies and other key federal housing-related policies as well 
as the negative housing externalities they seek to contain. Why? The current 
subsidies are not smart. This Part explains what “smart” means for purposes 
of this analysis, as well as how and why the subsidies fail to meet the mark. 
A. What are “Smart” Subsidies? 
When it comes to evaluating policies, rather than people, “smart” has a 
variety of possible meanings, several of which are relevant here. One use of 
the word is in connection with a system change that deploys resources more 
strategically to improve performance and reduce inefficiencies associated 
with its use. For example, “smart” energy grids deploy energy based on 
two-way communications with consumers in order to reduce waste, lower 
costs, and make power outages less likely.195  
The current homeowner subsidies are inefficient in that they reward 
homeowner decisions at large, and without regard to the negative 
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externalities homeowner decisions impose. As a result, at best, the federal 
government gets very little bang in containing these externalities for the 
very significant buck it spends promoting homeownership.196 At worst, it 
must pay to clean up damage resulting from homeowner choices it 
subsidizes.197 
“Smart” subsidies would reduce these inefficiencies by targeting 
financial incentives at homeowner decisions that also offset or reduce 
negative housing externalities. For example, as explained in Part IV.C, 
homeowner decisions to build new homes in higher risk coastal and 
floodplain areas can increase federal taxpayer burdens due to the 
government’s policy of providing disaster relief and increase flooding risk 
for those who already live in the area. A smarter homeowner subsidy in 
these areas might be limited to those who purchase homes that are built to 
maximize storm water absorption and/or minimize the likelihood of 
flooding damage.198 
A separate, though not unrelated, use of “smart” is in connection with 
policies that advance “sustainable development.” Development decisions 
that are sustainable take into account their impact on others, including 
future generations.199 The replacement of combined sewer and storm water 
systems that discharge into fresh water sources during large rainfalls with 
those that can instead temporarily store this water underground is an 
example of sustainable development. “Smart” is frequently used 
synonymously with “sustainable” when referring to places that implement 
sustainability practices (e.g. “Smart Cities”), especially when those places 
use advances in information and communication technology to do so.200 
When used in this way, “smart” has a normative component. Sustainable 
development has specific environmental, economic, and social goals. These 
include protecting the planet from environmental degradation, conserving 
natural resources, striving for economic growth that does not heighten 
socioeconomic segmentation, and creating places to live that are inclusive, 
safe, and resilient.201 The federal housing policies that are the subject of 
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Part IV fit comfortably within these goals. So, as with the first meaning of 
the word discussed above, “smart” in this instance means policies that 
minimize the negative externalities associated with development. The 
current homeowner subsidies are not smart because they are completely 
insensitive to them. 
Another definition of “smart” has emerged in the technology field. Smart 
devices are those that are capable of sensing a particular user’s needs or a 
change in environment and modifying their performance accordingly.202 
Smart data refers to data that can be analyzed and converted to actionable 
insights to address a particular problem.203 The key concepts are 
individualized, adaptable, and actionable. 
These concepts are meaningful to crafting effective housing strategies. 
This is because housing markets are highly localized. The United States 
consists not of one nor even of fifty housing markets, but rather thousands 
of highly localized markets that vary significantly in strengths and 
challenges. For example, high density cities with robust economies have 
thriving real estate markets by most measures, but grapple with inadequate 
supply and affordability issues, particularly for low and middle income 
homeowners.204 Post-industrial Rust Belt cities have more anemic housing 
markets with vast inventories of antiquated or deteriorating vacant homes 
that deplete surrounding home values and pose public health issues.205 
Certain coastal areas face rising tides, and need to re-think how, where, and 
whether housing exists.206 New growth Southwestern cities face high 
demand, but limited natural resources to support this demand.207 Within 
each of these local housing markets exist even smaller submarkets that 
reflect different amenities, job access, and housing stock, among other 
factors. Smart homeowner subsidies would be perceptive and adaptable 
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enough to address different problems in different places. By this standard 
too, the current homeowner subsidies are clearly not smart. They are 
simplistic and monolithic with no intended sensitivity to the challenges 
faced by different housing markets and submarkets. 
So a definition of smarter homeowner subsidies is emerging. They would 
be more carefully targeted, aiming to increase the social benefits (or reduce 
the social costs) that follow from homeowner decisions and capable of 
adaptation among and within different housing markets. 
B. Why the Current Homeowner Subsidies Are Not Smart 
Before considering whether and how smarter federal homeowner 
subsidies are feasible, it is helpful to understand why the current subsidies 
are designed as they are. This article offers three explanations. 
1. Idealization of Homeownership 
One explanation is a historic cultural attitude in which the homeowner 
subsidies are rooted that views all homeownership as “good” (in economist-
speak, resulting only in positive internalities and externalities). The federal 
government has long idealized homeownership as possessing multiple 
virtues that have since gained popular acceptance. Perhaps foremost is the 
view first popularized in the 1920s and 1930s that homeownership 
promotes good citizenship and stable communities, appealing qualities 
during the social unrest and political radicalism that followed from mass 
urbanization in the early 20th century.208 In the ensuing decades, the 
government saw the expansion of homeownership as the means to address a 
host of social, economic, and political problems, including post-World War 
II population expansion, slum removal, and racial unrest.209 Towards the 
end of the century, in the context of rising home prices and a shift away 
from New Deal and welfare state policies, politicians cast homeownership 
as an ideal vehicle for household savings and the accumulation of wealth.210 
From the perspective of the federal government, then, homeownership 
has typically been something to promote rather than regulate. This approach 
finds support in the U.S. Constitution’s deference to state and local 
governments on matters of land use and sacrosanct view of private property 
rights.211 Congress has occasionally intervened to legislate on certain land 
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use matters, like environmental protection and housing discrimination, 
when it has determined that relying on more localized levels of 
governmental to independently regulate will fail to consistently or 
adequately address significant harm to others.212 It has also used its tax and 
spend authority to offer financial incentives to prompt state and local 
governments to take action that reflects federal concerns.213 But as it relates 
to individual homeowners, federal policy has focused more on creating 
opportunities to own homes than on trying to meaningfully influence where 
or in what types of homes homeowners live. The design of the homeowner 
subsidies reflects this mindset. 
2. Administrative Simplicity 
Like many federal tax code adjustments to taxable income, the 
homeowner subsidies are tax incentives trapped in the bodies of exclusions 
and deductions from taxable income. Exclusions and deductions are 
different devices for accomplishing the same task—i.e. removing otherwise 
taxable dollars from tax.214 The difference between them is primarily a 
matter of timing. An exclusion keeps otherwise taxable dollars from 
entering a taxpayer’s pool of gross income in the first place, while a 
deduction subtracts them from a taxpayer’s gross income in the process of 
tabulating her taxable income. 
Exclusions and deductions are straightforward, effective, and easy to 
justify mechanisms for removing dollars from a household’s tax base that 
Congress believes do not really constitute income (a “normative” 
adjustment).215 They are also easy to administer as the taxpayer simply 
claims them on her return. The tax savings on exclusions and deductions 
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are greater for higher income taxpayers because, as explained earlier, the 
amount excluded or deducted would be taxed at a higher marginal rate.216 
But this should not be a concern from a policy perspective, because the 
amounts removed do not fall within a normative definition of income and 
so are not properly taxable in the first place. 
More controversially, Congress has also employed exclusions and 
deductions to accomplish social policy. For example, the tax code provides 
a deduction for college tuition and fees up to $4,000 per year to encourage 
taxpayers (and their dependents) to go to college.217 It is when influencing 
social policy that exclusions and deductions are susceptible to becoming 
upside down subsidies because they are more valuable to high income 
taxpayers than low income ones.218 In fact, many have questioned why 
Congress, when its intent is to encourage certain social behavior, does not 
use a more flexible, less regressive mechanism like grants.219 To address 
this problem, many exclusions and deductions come packaged with income 
caps, and other income-sensitive limitations.220 If not carefully crafted, 
exclusions and deductions meant to encourage social behavior can be 
regressive, overbroad, and blunt instruments. 
This is the case with the homeowner subsidies. The income and benefit 
limitations on homeowner subsidies do not meaningfully alter their 
regressive qualities.221 It is the reason that the subsidies don’t even do a 
good job of accomplishing their ostensible purpose of making 
homeownership more accessible. Some commentators have identified 
normative reasons or other justifications for each of the homeowner 
subsidies that could account for their packaging as deductions and 
exclusions.222 The more plausible read is that they took the form of what 
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were, at the times they originated, the simplest and most conventional 
mechanisms for creating tax preferences, without much regard for their 
regressivity or effectiveness in actually promoting homeownership.223  
3.  Political Entrenchment 
The final explanation is political. Once entrenched, tax expenditures are 
very difficult to modify, even in the face of substantial criticism. Taxpayers 
and industry groups come to expect the financial benefits associated with a 
particular tax break and, if those impacted are broad and powerful enough, 
any proposed significant cutback invites peril for those political actors who 
support it. 
This has certainly been the case for the homeowner subsidies, often 
described as one of the “third rails” of American politics.224 The subsidies 
benefit a powerful coalition of political interests. Those who receive the 
lion’s share of the benefits are upper middle income households, who vote 
in high proportions and, even more significantly, make up the donor base of 
both major political parties.225 Because housing prices are significantly 
higher in large coastal cities, homeowners in these areas also benefit 
disproportionately from the homeowner subsidies.226 Interestingly, many of 
the more liberal politicians, who would otherwise push hardest against 
subsidies distributed so heavily in favor of the wealthy, represent these 
coastal cities and, in pursuit of their constituents’ interests, defend the 
subsidies.227 And then there is the highly vested and vociferous 
participation of two of the nation’s largest and most broadly influential 
special interest groups—the National Association of Realtors and the 
National Association of Homebuilders.228 At the first sign of any potential 
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roll back of the homeowner subsidies, these groups spring to action and let 
their dissatisfaction be known in ways that have caused even the staunchest 
of tax loophole closers to tread carefully.229 
At first glance, political theorists would refer to the challenge of rolling 
back the homeowner subsidies as a case of reform that has concentrated 
costs and highly diffuse benefits, which is among the most difficult to 
enact.230 That is to say that, in this instance, the losses resulting from 
eliminating all or part of the subsidies are concentrated among a distinct 
group who are highly motivated to vocalize opposition (and politically 
powerful).231 Meanwhile, the resulting benefits would be spread out among 
the population at large, potentially simply through increasing the 
government’s tax revenue. This means the potential beneficiaries have had 
little motivation to support reform.232 
Some additional factors have added to the intractability of the status quo. 
The first is that even though the lion’s share of the benefits go to upper 
middle and high income taxpayers, many households receive at least a 
small bump from the homeowner subsidies and, thus, see themselves as 
vested in their survival. For example, most homeowners can claim the 
capital gains exclusion on home sales, even if lower-income households see 
a much smaller benefit.233 The second is that some economists and virtually 
all industry group experts have predicted a housing market Armageddon if 
the homeowner subsidies are removed.234 This is predicated on the 
assumption that the subsidies have been capitalized into higher home 
prices, which will fall if the subsidies disappear, decreasing the value of the 
principal asset of many homeowners.235 Although the extent to which home 
prices would fall (and exactly for whom they would fall) is unclear, the 
mere notion that it could happen has had a stifling effect on reform.236 
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The result is that the homeowner subsidies have come to function like 
entitlements, reserved primarily for upper two income quintiles of 
American households, rather than strategic investments, adaptable to 
different housing markets and capable of containing negative housing 
externalities. This is not to say that there is no hope for smarter homeowner 
subsidies. But the tasks of designing and implementing them are 
challenging ones. 
VI. IN SEARCH OF SMARTER HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES 
While they have proven very difficult to roll back, calls for reform of one 
or more of the homeowner subsidies are virtually unceasing. A long line of 
policy analysts, economists, tax experts, and legislators from places that 
experience less benefit from the subsidies have turned the mortgage interest 
deduction, in particular, into a popular punching bag.237 Three consecutive 
Presidential administrations have started down the path towards reform, 
although none to date have succeeded.238 
A. An Assessment of Current Proposals 
Variations abound, but the proposals for reform by and large fall into two 
principal camps. The first camp seeks to eliminate or reduce the 
homeowner subsidies without replacing them.239 At the root of this 
approach are contentions that the subsidies either do not work or are not 
defensible, and should not be used.240 Common to this line of criticism are 
claims that homeowner subsidies unfairly preference homeowners over 
renters, inflate home prices, and require all taxpayers to foot the bill for the 
housing preference of one segment of the population.241 A more equitable 
approach would be to use the money spent on the subsidies to lower 
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everyone’s taxes and let them make up their own mind as to whether to rent 
or own.242 
Recent Republican tax reform proposals emanate from this camp, 
although they are mindful of the political risks of proposing a complete 
elimination of long-standing tax breaks.243 They propose significantly 
increasing the standard deduction, which would reduce the number of 
taxpayers who would find the MID and SALT valuable (without making 
them worse off financially) while lowering marginal tax rates, which would 
reduce the value of these deductions to those who would still claim them.244 
Some proposals also call for imposing or lowering caps on one or more of 
the subsidies to limit to what extent homeowners, especially higher income 
ones, can claim them.245 The tax revenue gained from these caps would be 
used to pay for lower overall tax rates. 
The second camp wants to improve the performance of the homeowner 
subsidies and in particular the MID, in making homeownership more 
affordable for those who are financially constrained. The central contention 
in this camp is that the subsidies would work better if they were built better. 
Most of these proposals call for converting the mortgage interest deduction 
to a tax credit designed to ensure low and middle income homebuyers can 
take advantage of it.246 
A tax credit is a dollar for dollar reduction in how much a taxpayer owes, 
as opposed to an exclusion or deduction, which reduces the amount of 
income on which the taxpayer must pay tax.247 So a tax credit is potentially 
of equal value to all taxpayers, no matter their tax bracket, if they have tax 
liability to offset. Some tax credits go further and are “refundable,” which 
means the IRS will pay the full amount of the credit to the person claiming 
it even if the credit exceeds the claimant’s tax liability (or the claimant has 
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no tax liability at all).248 These features make the tax credit approach 
popular among reformers who seek to use the tax code to encourage 
homeownership without creating an upside-down subsidy. Capping the 
amount of a mortgage that qualifies for the credit goes even further in 
equalizing the benefit. For example, a 2005 tax reform panel established by 
President George W. Bush recommended converting the mortgage interest 
deduction to a flat tax credit equal to 15% of the mortgage interest a 
homeowner pays each year, but limiting the maximum amount of the 
mortgage eligible for the credit to 125% of a community’s median local 
home price.249 
This article agrees with both camps that the homeowner subsidies ought 
to be reformed. The evidence is overwhelming that the current subsidies 
primarily encourage those who are relatively affluent and would already 
buy homes to buy larger and more expensive ones. This is neither the 
purported objective of the subsidies nor responsive to a separate market 
failure. 
This article agrees with the second camp but disagrees with the first 
camp as to the defensibility of the concept of homeowner subsidies. 
Ensuring that a sufficient supply of affordable housing exists to shelter 
citizens is a legitimate interest of government. Housing affordability is a 
persistent and growing challenge for low and middle income households 
throughout the country, especially in this era of growing income disparity. 
Moreover, although the subject of debate, many have cited to the positive 
internalities and externalities associated with homeownership.250 So if the 
government is to be in the field of subsidizing housing at all, then making 
homeownership more attainable and affordable, as an alternative to renting, 
is defensible. The proposals from the second camp are undeniably more 
efficient and equitable ways of accomplishing that objective than the 
current homeowner subsidies and very likely more so than proposals from 
the first camp.251 
However, the proposals from these two camps are not, on their face, 
smarter subsidies in the way Part V describes. One could speculate that 
either an elimination or roll back of the current homeowner subsidies or a 
conversion to an affordability oriented tax credit might incidentally reduce 
                                                                                                                 
 248 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (Earned Income Tax Credit). 
 249 MACK III ET AL., supra note 238. See also, FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 246 (noting 
that other proposals for conversion to tax credit each include an upper limit on amount of 
mortgage eligible for credit). 
 250 See, e.g., Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 3. 
 251 One caveat, however, is that policymakers would need to consider whether broadly 
available tax credits would simply be capitalized into higher home prices in supply-
constrained housing markets. 
2017 / IN SEARCH OF SMARTER HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES   249 
some of the negative housing externalities discussed in Part IV. For 
example, higher income households would either receive no or less 
mortgage based tax relief under any of those proposals and, thus, have less 
incentive to seek out larger and more expensive homes on low density lots 
or in exclusive neighborhoods. Also, lower and middle income and 
minority households might see lower housing prices (if one or more of the 
current homeowner subsidies are eliminated) or increased buying power (if 
affordability-oriented tax credits are adopted) and so presumably would 
have greater ability to move into and integrate neighborhoods of 
opportunity. On the other hand, one could also speculate as to how certain 
negative housing externalities might be exacerbated. The push of additional 
households into more affluent suburban and exurban areas could exacerbate 
sprawl and accelerate disinvestment and further isolation of marginalized 
communities. Furthermore, the proposals from the two main camps are not 
adaptable to address the varying range of strengths and challenges faced by 
different housing markets. 
The bottom line is that none of the proposals from these two camps are 
specifically engineered to be “smarter” as this article envisions. In that 
sense, they represent missed opportunities to turn homeowner subsidies into 
tools for meaningfully reducing negative housing externalities. The aim of 
the rest of this article is to consider whether and how smarter homeowner 
subsidies might be engineered. 
A critical starting point is to recognize that different homeowner choices 
as to home location and form result in different amounts and types of 
housing externalities. Accordingly, rather than rewarding homeowner 
decisions at large and in roughly equivalent ways, smarter homeowner 
subsidies should be equipped to reward certain decisions, but not others, or 
to do so in varying amounts according to the housing externalities they 
generate. 
A smaller contingent of reformers has offered ideas on allocating 
homeowner subsidies more strategically and selectively. As part of a 
package of reforms aimed at improving affordability in inelastic, supply-
constrained housing markets, Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko have 
called for capping the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners in those 
markets and rebating the resulting tax revenue to local government in 
exchange for its efforts to increase housing supply.252 The goal would be to 
reduce overall home prices and allow more households to access these 
opportunity-rich markets.253 In the midst of cleanup efforts from the 
foreclosure crisis, Alan Mallach called for eliminating or scaling back the 
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MID and investing the tax revenue gained into a package of investor and 
homeowner tax credits to encourage private reinvestment in “tipping point” 
neighborhoods.254 Roberta Mann proposed replacing the MID with tax 
credits that incentivize the purchase of modest sized homes and those 
located near public transit as a strategy for reducing urban sprawl.255 
Meanwhile, Dorothy Brown, among others, has suggested limiting 
mortgage interest and property tax subsidies to those living in racially 
diverse neighborhoods.256 
Each of these proposals is thoughtfully formulated for the housing 
market problem it seeks to address. In that sense, each calls for a smarter 
form of homeowner subsidy. That said, each drills down on only one type 
of problem or negative housing externality and some focus on a challenge 
unique to certain types of housing submarkets. The purpose of this article is 
to think more systemically and with the aim of identifying a viable 
approach for designing homeowner subsidies capable of addressing a 
collection of different housing externalities across many different types of 
markets and submarkets. 
B. Examining Comparable Subsidies 
Fortunately, the slate is not completely blank. State and local 
governments are increasingly using demand-side tax subsidies to influence 
business and homeowner location and form decisions when they believe 
doing so will generate sufficient public benefit within their boundaries to 
outweigh the forgone taxes. In fact, the driving force for doing so has often 
been to combat negative externalities, like those following from chronic 
economic or housing disinvestment. The body of public finance research 
that has emerged on the efficacy of these subsidies is worth examining. 
A good starting point is the track record on demand-side tax subsidies 
meant to attract and retain businesses and encourage job creation. Although 
aimed at businesses rather than homeowners, the record is deeper and more 
established as many states and localities have engaged in this practice for 
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several decades.257 In fact, the practice has become so pervasive that most 
businesses seeking to relocate (or simply considering whether to stay put) 
have come to expect generous state and local tax abatement to be a part of 
the package and often insinuate that they are prepared to go to the highest 
bidder. This has led to an unhealthy level of competition and a race to the 
bottom among states and cities, in which subsidies are so broadly available, 
overly generous and free of conditions that they become unhinged from 
accomplishing discernible, and justifiable public benefits.258 
In this failure lies an important lesson about the value of carefully 
limiting and targeting demand-side tax subsidies. Among those economists 
and policy analysts who support business attraction and retention subsidies, 
the prevailing opinion is that subsidies for which the resulting benefits 
justify the costs are those that are carefully targeted and monitored.259 This 
includes being: geographically limited (to those places under great fiscal 
stress or where a market failure truly acts as a barrier to entry); right-sized 
in terms of amount, scope, and class of eligible recipients to tie closely to 
the problem the subsidy seeks to overcome; periodically evaluated to make 
sure the subsidy works; and retractable if the business isn’t holding up its 
end of the bargain.260 Even many of those skeptical about such subsidies 
acknowledge that carefully constructed subsidies approved after a thorough 
and open cost-benefit discussion may sometimes be justified.261 
Although the subject of less study, even more substantively relevant is 
the experience of local governments that have used property tax abatement 
to induce prospective homebuyers to buy new homes or substantially 
rehabilitate existing homes within their boundaries. Numerous cities have 
adopted policies like this in response to steep population declines.262 Their 
stated objective is typically to combat the negative externalities that result 
from chronic disinvestment in their communities, like the decimation of the 
local tax base and the human, social, and economic costs associated with 
deteriorating neighborhoods.263 
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Here are some of the lessons learned concerning taxes, subsidies and 
homeowner decisions. First, tax rates and overall tax burdens associated 
with purchasing in different jurisdictions within a region are influential in 
homebuyer decisions as to where to locate, especially where supply is 
elastic (i.e. comparable alternatives exist in nearby communities).264 
Likewise, subsidies in the form of tax breaks are capable of influencing 
prospective homebuyer decisions.265 However, they are not the exclusive, 
nor even necessarily the driving factor, as to where a homebuyer chooses to 
purchase.266 Furthermore, although subsidies can influence behavior, the 
challenge is in achieving the desired results.267 For example, residential 
property tax abatement in Cleveland, Ohio has been successful in attracting 
new high income residents to the city, improving neighboring property 
values and even in creating net fiscal gain for the city’s tax base.268 It has 
not, however, reversed overall population decline nor improved certain 
important neighborhood outcome measurements.269 
Success appears to be a result of several factors. These include carefully 
tailoring the subsidies to attract the types of development and homeowners 
that the locality has determined are important to meet its objectives.270 They 
also include vigilance in monitoring the impact of the subsidy to ensure it is 
at the correct price point and has the right other features to actually 
influence consumer decisions, and the adaptability to adjust the policy as 
needed based on this data.271 Subsidies seem to be most viable when they 
are not designed in isolation but, rather, cognizant of other factors that 
affect homebuyer decision-making in that particular community (e.g., 
public school quality, proximity to metropolitan area, demographic trends) 
and ideally as part of a more comprehensive, community strategic 
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development plan.272 Finally, policymakers should take the long view in 
expecting results, as it may take several years to see the type of 
improvement that justifies the short-term costs of the subsidies.273 
Collectively, these studies suggest the mix of qualities smarter 
homeowner subsidies should possess. These types of subsidies work best 
when they are tailored, limited, variable, and complementary. Tailored 
means crafted to encourage behavior that squarely addresses the identified 
problem. If the problem is deteriorating or antiquated housing stock and a 
market for housing exists, then appropriately tailored subsidies should fund 
home rehabilitation or new construction. If the problem is residential 
segregation, then tailored subsidies could include incentivizes for excluded 
homeowners to purchase in exclusive communities or non-excluded 
homebuyers to purchase in excluded communities. 
Limited means not too broadly available. Instead, a subsidy should be 
restricted to those individual homeowner decisions demonstrated to achieve 
the subsidy’s objective. If the objective of a subsidy is to offset chronic 
community disinvestment, then it should not be available to a homebuyer 
seeking to purchase in a healthy housing market. 
Subsidies should be variable in the sense that they allow for variations 
across housing markets and submarkets. As discussed earlier, different 
markets face different problems and possess different strengths, and often 
contain multiple submarkets. Furthermore, homeowners or prospective 
home buyers within one market or submarket may not respond in the same 
way as those within others. 
In a similar vein, the subsidies should be complementary, in that they 
should support, not counteract, other federal, state, and local efforts to 
address negative housing externalities. Ideally, subsidies should be 
designed so that they coordinate with appropriate community planning and 
the investment of other private, public, and philanthropic resources. 
As a final note, it bears mention that state and local government tax 
abatement, as a means to attract development, is frequently criticized for 
being inequitable. This is because relieving the tax burden of one party 
typically means that other taxpayers within the jurisdiction must make up 
for this forgone revenue or that the jurisdiction simply goes without the 
revenue, meaning schools and other local services suffer. Equity objections 
may be less intense with federal subsidies, because the tax burdens at issue 
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are spread out across the entire country rather than across a city. 
Furthermore, the current homeowner subsidies are, in fact, highly 
inequitable and regressive, and so smarter subsidies may very well serve as 
an improvement.274 Nonetheless, a desirable quality of virtually any subsidy 
is that it “pencil out”– i.e., demonstrate a net gain and return on investment 
for the community. A study of the previously mentioned Cleveland 
property tax abatement showed that over time it generated a dollar and a 
half of property tax for every dollar abated, and this finding aided 
significantly in its renewal.275 
C. Conceptual Models for Smarter Subsidies 
Part VI.B looked to state and local examples of smarter subsidies. This is 
because there are far fewer examples of federal-level, demand-side 
homeowner subsidies that aim to accomplish objectives other than 
rewarding homeownership at large or making it more affordable. Perhaps 
this is because it is challenging to conceive of a subsidy (or collection of 
subsidies) that works across thousands of different housing markets that 
experience and are responding to a range of different housing externalities 
in a variety of different ways. There is an inherent tension between the 
highly tailored qualities of the ideal subsidy and designing an approach that 
could work across the board. Nevertheless, three models present 
theoretically plausible approaches and are worth discussion here. 
1.  Subsidy Eligible/Ineligible Zones 
The first model is to adopt a single homeowner subsidy aimed at 
reducing homeownership costs, but to make it only claimable by those 
whose homeownership decision also reduces other negative housing 
externalities. An example would be offering the subsidy to homeowners 
who live in communities that are disinvested or disinvesting. Or, to those 
who purchase median-sized homes in the built environment or within new 
development boundaries designed to reduce suburban sprawl. Or, to those 
who purchase homes in racially integrated neighborhoods. The latter two 
solutions are similar to those posed by Professors Mann and Brown, 
respectively.276 In any of these scenarios, the end result would probably be 
a complicated national map of subsidy-eligible and ineligible zones. 
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A model like this would have the potential to reduce whatever negative 
housing externality or externalities at which the subsidy was aimed on a 
grand scale. Take the example of a subsidy aimed at encouraging 
homeownership in disinvested communities. Homeowners in these 
communities would receive a considerable discount on their housing costs, 
while homeowners in communities with normally functioning housing 
markets would not. Using a hypothetical $4,000 annual subsidy,277 a 
homeowner in a qualifying community would receive a $40,000 discount 
on housing costs over a ten-year period (the average homeowner tenure). 
This level of subsidy would presumably drive some segment of 
homeowners to purchase homes in disinvested communities and others to 
stay put. Demand for homes in qualifying communities would probably 
increase, as would private investment, home prices, and the tax base. Over 
time, increased tax revenue should help to improve public services while 
decreasing crime, public health risks, and infrastructure concerns. 
There are, however, several challenges with a solution along these 
barriers. One challenge relates to the degree of tailoring that may be 
required to ensure that the subsidy accomplishes its objective. For example, 
what amount of subsidy would be necessary to impact homeowner 
decisions? Would that amount need to vary by community based on 
regional home prices? What constitutes a “disinvested community”? At 
what point is it no longer considered disinvested, such that subsidies can be 
eliminated? If a community reached that point, would a separate subsidy 
need to remain in place for lower income households to keep homes 
affordable as prices rise? 
Moreover, how would policymakers account for other, more community-
specific variations? For example, a disinvested community near a high 
growth area might turn around quickly, at which point gentrification 
becomes a concern. On the other hand, in a Rust Belt city with too much 
housing stock, the city might prefer to limit the subsidy to “tipping point” 
neighborhoods (those with greater turnaround potential) and redeploy 
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largely abandoned neighborhoods to park space or wetland recovery. In 
dealing with thousands of communities, it is easy to imagine that many 
different types of development scenarios could emerge and that some level 
of variability in how a subsidy is deployed would be important. Analogous 
sets of questions would undoubtedly arise for subsidies targeted at other 
negative housing externalities. 
Allowing for subsidies that are highly tailored to work in particular 
communities also raises the possibility of an unaddressed constitutional 
issue. The Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution requires that 
federal tax code provisions apply uniformly throughout the United States.278 
Theoretically, this clause prohibits Congress from enacting tax provisions 
that distinguish taxpayers in one geographic area over those in another.279 
The very limited case law has applied the provision quite narrowly, 
allowing tax laws to stand provided they discuss the distinction in 
nongeographic terms or where it is at least possible that they could do so.280 
In other words, the Uniformity Clause does not prohibit Congress from 
making a tax distinction based on “geographically isolated problems”281 
(such as, presumably, community disinvestment, residential segregation, or 
environmental harm), as long as this distinction is motivated by the 
condition and not “actual geographic discrimination.”282 While this 
interpretation appears to provide a good deal of leeway for Congress to 
craft tax subsidies tailored to address negative housing externalities that 
occur in particular housing markets, it also indicates some theoretic outer 
limits on allowing specific housing market refinements to these 
subsidies.283 To address this concern, Congress could provide the subsidies 
outside of the tax code (for example, as HUD-administered grants). 
Another challenge is that the disinvested community subsidy addresses 
only one type of negative housing externality. Would it aid, hamper, or be 
inconsequential as it relates to other externalities? It is reasonable to 
speculate that some overlap exists. For example, incentivizing moves to 
racially integrated neighborhoods would probably reduce socioeconomic 
segregation, given that poverty rates are significantly higher among certain 
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racial groups.284 These incentives might also aid in the reduction of 
suburban sprawl, because minority households are disproportionately 
located in older, urban areas that white households may move into in order 
to obtain the subsidy. On the other hand, this type of subsidy may also have 
the opposite effect. More economically mobile minority households may 
move from older urban areas into newer, suburban, and exurban 
communities, increasing demand for this type of housing and further 
isolating those left behind. Policymakers would then be left either to 
determine which negative externalities matter most and prioritize 
accordingly, or to try and craft a map of subsidy eligible and ineligible 
areas that is responsive to each of the externalities or most socially 
beneficially in the aggregate. Then, there is the question of how to treat 
individual homes that cause fewer negative housing externalities (say a 
home fully powered by solar energy), but sit in non-qualifying communities 
(e.g., one with a thriving local housing market). Marshalling information to 
pinpoint areas and homes that represent socially optimal homeowner 
decisions would be daunting. 
Yet another concern is the potential impact on homeowners living in 
areas or in homes that would no longer qualify for homeowner subsidies. 
As demand would increase for qualifying communities and homes, it 
inevitably would decrease for non-qualifying communities and homes. This 
would reduce home prices and homeowner equity in the latter, although the 
extent is unknown and depends to some degree on how fully capitalized the 
current homeowner subsidies are into a particular community’s home 
prices. Nonetheless, some homeowners could see a significant drop in the 
value of their homes, which could call into serious question the fairness and 
political viability of this type of approach. 
2. À La Carte Subsidies 
A second model would involve Congress authorizing a broader range of 
separate subsidies, each targeted at a type of homeowner decision that 
serves to reduce a type of negative housing externality. Think of this as the 
à la carte approach. One subsidy, like a tax credit that offsets a percentage 
of a homeowner’s mortgage interest expenses, could be widely available in 
order to promote affordability. On top of that, Congress could stack 
additional subsidies to encourage specific homeowner behavior, such as 
making qualifying home repairs in a community with older housing stock, 
purchasing a LEED certified home, and purchasing a home in an integrated 
neighborhood. 
                                                                                                                 
 284 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
258 University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1 
Congress has actually used this model in the recent past. Between 2005 
and 2016, it provided a collection of federal income tax credits to 
homeowners who purchased energy efficient appliances, made specified 
home improvements that increase energy efficiency, and installed 
renewable energy systems for their homes.285 A principal underlying 
rationale was to encourage homeowner purchases that reduce the negative 
environmental externalities resulting from residential energy 
consumption.286 Between 2008 and 2010, Congress also made available a 
tax credit of up to $8,000 for first-time homebuyers (later expanded to 
include many other homebuyers) to help stabilize the national housing 
market as home prices tumbled during the foreclosure crisis.287 
The à la carte approach also has the potential to impact the behavior of a 
substantial number of homeowners and, therefore, reduce negative housing 
externalities on a large scale. The credits would offset the perceived or 
actual costs of certain socially beneficial homeowner behavior—like 
repairing an older home when the homeowner would otherwise be unlikely 
to fully recoup the costs. This helps not only the homeowner who receives 
the subsidy, but also has potential spillover effects on neighboring 
homeowners whose homes might increase in value as a result and who then 
would be more likely to make similar repairs. 
One challenge with the presumably smaller,288 à la carte subsidies is 
designing them so that they actually prompt the desired behavior and have 
the desired impact. Both the homeowner energy credits and first-time 
homebuyer credit faced questions as to whether they served as effective 
incentives.289 The individual energy credits were relatively small and also 
subject to low overall caps raising concerns that they did not act as much of 
an incentive and instead were mostly claimed as a windfall by those who 
already planned to make the subsidized investments.290 The homebuyer tax 
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credit was larger, caused home purchases to rise over a two year period, and 
probably helped keep the national housing market from total freefall.291 But 
whether it increased the overall homeownership rate or even had a 
sufficient long-term stabilizing impact on housing prices are largely in 
question. Because the credit had an expiration date, many analysts 
wondered if it simply caused those who already planned to purchase a home 
to do so earlier.292 
Moreover, the à la carte approach is potentially a scatter shot strategy. 
Unless carefully coordinated, a subsidy might support a homeowner 
decision that reduces one negative externality while simultaneously 
increasing others. For example, a homeowner might claim a renewable 
energy tax credit for putting solar panels on a new McMansion built on a 
floodplain. 
Finally, as with the first approach, policymakers would face the 
challenge of crafting subsidies at the national level to work in thousands of 
different housing submarkets. A home rehabilitation tax credit that 
incentivizes the repair of a historic home in a tipping point neighborhood 
with rebound potential may make perfect sense. On the other hand, the use 
of that subsidy to repair an antiquated home in a mostly abandoned 
neighborhood where new construction or re-purposing is a better strategy 
may make much less sense. 
3.  Community and Project Level Subsidies 
A third model represents the other side of the coin, in that it is more 
bottom up than top down. Congress could authorize homeowner subsidies 
to be allocated on a community-by-community or project-by-project basis 
and in coordination with other community or public sector efforts to 
address negative housing externalities in a comprehensive way. 
This type of subsidy could be deployed in a couple of different scenarios. 
One scenario would be in support of housing development proposed as part 
of locally driven, community planning that meets federally prescribed 
standards. For example, in Cleveland, Ohio, a coalition of community 
organizations, city and county agencies, and local technical assistance 
providers have prepared a comprehensive land use plan in response to a 
recognition that regional population decline and changing land-use patterns 
means the city has more developed property than it can sustain in the 
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foreseeable future.293 The plan, called “Re-imagining a More Sustainable 
Cleveland,” has been adopted by the Cleveland City Planning Commission 
and it proposes strategic redeployment of land in ways that stabilize and 
begin to revitalize neighborhoods with development potential, while 
devoting other land to green infrastructure (e.g. parks and storm water 
management), agriculture and energy generation.294 
If a plan like this meets prescribed standards for community 
participation, sustainability, and the reduction of negative externalities, the 
federal government could approve homeowner subsidies for use in those 
neighborhoods that the plan targeted as having the potential for residential 
revitalization. In this way, the subsidies would be more selectively available 
in circumstances where informed local actors could demonstrate that 
spurring homeownership or a particular type of homeowner behavior would 
be highly beneficial. The subsidies would serve as one arrow in a quiver of 
strategies that a community might use to engage in strategic development. 
When used in this scenario, the homeowner subsidy should almost certainly 
take the form of grants rather than tax code subsidies to avoid the potential 
Uniformity Clause concerns identified in the discussion of the first 
model.295 
Another scenario could be in support of other government-funded 
housing development programs aimed at reducing one or more negative 
externalities. For example, over the past few decades, two major federal 
programs—HOPE VI and now the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative—have 
sought to replace distressed public and assisted housing projects with better 
quality mixed-income housing in order to reduce residential segregation 
and break up concentrations of poverty.296 Very recently, a coalition of 
community development advocates launched a campaign for a new form of 
financing called the Neighborhood Housing Tax Credit, aimed at 
incentivizing developers and lenders to finance the construction and 
rehabilitation of housing that would attract moderate and middle income 
households to disinvested neighborhoods.297 These are both examples of 
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supply side initiatives aimed at reducing negative housing externalities. 
Offering homeowner subsidies directly to potential homebuyers in 
developments like these would provide a corresponding demand side 
incentive that could significantly increase the likelihood of success of these 
programs. 
This third approach is also the flipside of the other two in terms of its 
advantages and challenges. It serves as a much better vehicle for 
incorporating the unique aspects of each particular community’s housing 
market and submarkets into the allocation of subsidies. It coordinates with 
community planning and the investment of other public resources, and thus 
is likely to be highly complementary to local efforts to impact housing 
conditions. Because targeting of the subsidies originates at the local level 
where knowledge of the housing market is greatest identifying development 
that addresses all or most of the negative housing externalities also seems 
more achievable. The involvement of local policymakers might make 
monitoring the impact of the subsidies over time and adapting them as 
necessary much easier. 
Of course, there are challenges as well. This model would not catalyze 
substantial changes in homeowner behavior in one fell swoop as the other 
models potentially would. Changes would come about more gradually and 
sporadically. Deciding on and overseeing the allocation of subsidies on a 
project-by-project basis would also be more administratively burdensome 
and necessarily require significantly more federal time, attention and 
expense. 
This approach also assumes, especially in the scenario in which the 
subsidies would complement community planning, capacity at the local 
level across the country to generate comprehensive and useful plans that 
meet federal standards and take into account multiple forms of housing 
externalities. Federal funds and involvement to help interested, but capacity 
lacking, communities achieve this would probably be necessary. This is to 
say nothing of the increased susceptibility of locally driven processes to 
political and private interest influence and corruption. Coordinating this 
type of a program across such a large and diverse landscape could be a tall 
task. 
On the other hand, the federal government does have experience in 
overseeing similarly structured programs. Of particular relevance is the 
Community Development Block Grant program, which involves the 
allocation of federal investments in community development to local 
governments for implementation in response to planning priorities 
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identified at the local level.298 Using the infrastructure of an existing 
program, like CDBG, to allocate homeowner subsidies, rather than starting 
from scratch, could help overcome some of the administrative concerns. 
D. Data and Innovation as Gateways to Smarter Subsidies 
As noted throughout this article, a significant challenge to making 
homeowner subsidies smarter under any model is understanding the 
housing externalities at play within thousands of different housing markets 
and submarkets, and engineering the subsidies to be precise and sensitive 
enough to address these externalities. In this respect, the world is changing 
rapidly and in ways that portend success. 
The real estate industry, like many others, is in the midst of a data 
revolution. Online sources are compiling and making readily accessible 
property specific data on everything ranging from owner, parcel and 
building information, mortgages and liens, code violations, past sales 
history, crime and fire history, and more.299 Simultaneously, a data 
analytics industry has emerged. Firms in this industry have developed 
sophisticated algorithms and valuation models, which, coordinated with 
geographic mapping technology, can process spools of available data and 
translate it into digestible, real time, accurate market assessments of local 
housing conditions.300 
Predictably, much of the data analytics industry serves banks, insurance 
companies and mortgage servicers.301 However, a separate and growing 
segment of the industry, consisting of both nonprofit and for-profit entities, 
focuses on community planning and revitalization.302 Community leaders 
and local governments are working with these service providers to 
incorporate property and neighborhood specific data into more 
sophisticated, forward looking, and sustainable development plans. 
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There are many examples of this type of planning. Cities like Detroit,303 
Cincinnati,304 Kansas City,305 and Memphis,306 each confronted by large 
stockpiles of vacant and distressed properties, are creating data infused 
mapping interfaces covering every property within their boundaries. This 
visual mapping technology allows community leaders and agencies to more 
efficiently determine what code enforcement, demolition and rehabilitation 
strategies for which properties make the best (i.e. smartest) use of their 
resources. In Cleveland, a community development funding intermediary 
recently hired a “spatial econometrics” firm to use hedonic pricing models 
to determine which types of homes, if rehabilitated, would yield the highest 
increases in surrounding property values.307 This is another data-based 
mechanism for prioritizing the spending of a city’s limited public and 
philanthropic revitalization funds, in this case specifically to maximize 
positive externalities on neighbors and the local tax base. 
Smaller cities are getting into the game as well. Danville, Virginia, a 
former mill town, is just one example of a city with a size, location and 
economic base that suggests continued population stagnancy and perhaps 
even further contraction. Rather than simply letting development happen as 
it will and spread out further, Danville’s planning department worked with 
an urban development consulting firm to create a multi-tiered housing plan 
within the city’s current footprint. The plan delineates separate areas for 
targeted demolition, rehabilitation and growth based on what future 
homeowners are likely to seek and population projections.308 Meanwhile, 
the Center for Neighborhood Progress, a national nonprofit, has begun 
offering publications and technical assistance aimed at helping communities 
                                                                                                                 
 303 John Gallagher, Start-Up Firm Mines Data to Aid Detroit Blight Fight, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Jan. 16, 2016, 10:55 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/michigan/2016/01/16/blight-detroit-
econometrics/78645606/. 
 304 Janis Bowdler, Opinion, Mapping Blight at the Parcel Level in Cleveland, Columbus 
and Cincinnati, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 9, 2017), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/04/mapping_blight_in_cleveland_co.html
. 
 305 Ellie Moxley, To Tackle Blight Kansas City, Kansas, Will Crunch the Numbers, 
KCUR (June 14, 2016), http://kcur.org/post/tackle-blight-kansas-city-kansas-will-crunch-
numbers#stream/0. 
 306 Madeline Faber, Memphis Property Hub Using Micro-Level Data to Drive Solutions, 
THE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2016/aug/8/memphis-property-hub-using-micro-
level-data-to-drive-solutions/. 
 307 Rehab Impacts in Cleveland 2009-2015, DYNAMO METRICS, 
http://www.rehabimpact.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
 308 Sandy Smith, How to Shrink a Housing Market So It Can Grow Again, NEXT CITY 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/shrink-housing-market-growth. 
264 University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1 
large and small develop the capacity to use data to shape planning and 
revitalization decisions.309 
For sake of illustration, the above examples have focused on the use of 
property data, technology, and analytics to address community 
disinvestment. But these advances are also taking place with respect to the 
other negative housing externalities this article addresses. For example, 
HUD developed data-infused mapping tools for its fund recipients (state 
and local governments, and housing agencies) to use in measuring 
residential segregation within their boundaries and developing strategies to 
address it.310 The EPA has developed “smart location” maps, designed to 
reveal block-by-block characteristics like proximity to jobs, transit options 
and walkability, to encourage home seekers to make choices that lessen 
greenhouse gas emissions and improve their health and access to 
amenities.311 
E. A Path Forward 
Demand-side subsidies can influence homeowner behavior. As discussed 
throughout Part VI, if properly constructed, this can include encouraging 
homeowner decisions that impose fewer negative housing externalities (and 
create more positive ones). Rapid, recent advances in housing data, 
analytics and planning make the prospect of smarter homeowner subsidies 
increasingly more plausible. 
So how to proceed? While each model discussed in Part VI.C has 
potential advantages, the third would probably be the best starting point. 
This is due to its flexibility. It is the most adaptable to community-by-
community variations, can be integrated as a complement to other federal, 
state and local programs that subsidize housing, and lends itself most easily 
to experimentation and adjustment. In these ways, it holds the greatest 
potential for “smarter” subsidy design in the way this article envisions. 
Certain features are important to include if proceeding with the third 
model. First, community or project-level homeowner subsidies should take 
the form of homeowner grants or loans allocated through HUD, rather than 
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as tax breaks provided through the Internal Revenue Code. HUD, after all, 
is a housing agency. It has a great deal of experience allocating federal 
funding in response to community planning processes that identify 
localized funding needs. Just a few examples include the CDBG 
program,312 the Neighborhood Stabilization Program,313 and the HOME 
Investment Partnerships Program.314 The Internal Revenue Code, on the 
other hand, is not a good vehicle for delivering on social policy with as 
many moving parts as this would entail. Furthermore, there is a risk, 
discussed at various points in Part VI.C., that highly tailored, community 
specific subsidies delivered as tax breaks could violate the Uniformity 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution or at least appear to do so.315 
Second, local governments should serve as the applicants for and the 
ultimate distributer of homeowner subsidies within their boundaries. 
Congress and HUD would set the parameters for the housing objectives and 
types of homeowner decisions that the subsidies could support, and these 
would correlate closely with the negative housing externalities discussed 
throughout this article. But local communities would identify the specific 
instances in which they would deploy the subsidies. 
For example, a city grappling with disinvestment might identify several 
tipping point neighborhoods where an influx of new homeowners could 
provide the foundation for stabilization and a turnaround. This city might 
then propose in its application purchase grants for home buyers and local 
property tax offset grants for existing homeowners. HUD standards might 
additionally require that these grants advance (or at least not undermine) 
residential integration and environmental objectives. In addition, a 
community planning process should support the application for these types 
of subsidies. This is similar to the design of already existing HUD programs 
like CDBG, NSP and HOME.316 The basic premise is that HUD provides 
oversight, but communities are given significant leeway in proposing the 
best specific uses of the funds. 
Third, given that this type of a subsidy model represents a significant 
departure from the current model, it would be best initiated as a pilot 
program, limited in scope and subject to review, until its merits are 
demonstrated and its preliminary kinks are worked out. In addition, 
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Congress should strongly consider making this program competitive in its 
pilot phase in order to encourage innovation and to identify communities 
with the capacity to succeed. 
Federal agencies have significant recent experience launching new 
funding programs in this manner. The second round of Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program funding involved a competitive application process in 
which local governments and nonprofit applicants had to demonstrate to 
HUD that their proposed use of the funds would help to stabilize targeted 
neighborhoods (while achieving a number of other objectives, including 
environmental ones), resulted from a planning process and that they 
possessed the capacity to carry it out.317 In a similar vein, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $4.35 billion for a 
competitive grant fund for state plans that accomplished a broad range of 
objectives related to improving educational outcomes, and might be used as 
models for other states.318 This approach to funding has become a useful 
method for spurring innovation and reform within the public sector, as local 
actors are highly motivated by available funds to get creative in designing 
plans capable of success. Ultimately, a pilot phase may reveal that it is 
actually feasible and more efficient to allocate homeowner subsidies using 
the first or second models, or that some type of hybrid model would work 
best. 
A pilot phase would also allow policymakers to determine the impact of 
the third model on housing affordability and equity concerns. Smarter 
homeowner subsidies, as discussed throughout this article, would involve 
direct, selectively available subsidies to private individuals, the allocation 
of which is influenced by data analytics, market factors, and local leaders 
who are also focused on keeping or making their communities competitive. 
This raises well-merited and significant concerns regarding housing access 
and equity, especially as it relates to politically marginalized groups. 
Congress should include standards and safeguards to address these 
concerns, which HUD should be charged with implementing. Yet, it is 
reasonable to expect that this will not be a perfect science, and will take 
time.  
A pilot model would make sense for another reason as well. It may match 
best with the political challenges certain to follow from tackling reform as 
charged as that involving the homeowner subsidies. As Part V discussed, 
any effort at changing the current homeowner subsidies will encounter 
immediate and stern resistance from the powerful interests benefiting from 
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them. This resistance may include invoking, not without merit, the potential 
for a drop in home prices that could result from a significant roll back of the 
subsidies. A more politically feasible scenario for reform would involve an 
incremental roll back of one or more of the current homeowner subsidies, 
by lowering the existing caps on the amount of gain that qualifies for the 
capital gains exclusion or the value of the mortgage or property that 
qualifies for the MID or property tax deduction. Proceeding in this way 
would primarily only affect the tax breaks of wealthy homeowners (and 
only on a portion of their tax breaks), be unlikely to significantly disrupt 
home prices and yield significant tax revenue for the federal government.319 
A portion of this revenue could then be devoted to piloting smarter 
homeowner subsidies. 
It bears repeating here that the quest for smarter homeowner subsidies is 
not a call for abandoning homeowner subsidies that seek to make 
homeownership more affordable. The calls for more thoughtfully 
constructed tax credits aimed at low and middle homeowners, in what Part 
VI.A described as the second camp of proposals, is in a sense a smarter 
homeowner subsidy as it relates to home affordability. The goal of this 
article is not to work to the exclusion of this objective, but rather to 
advocate for subsidy reform that is also smarter as it relates to negative 
housing externalities. These two goals can and should be complementary. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The prospect of smarter homeowner subsidies is tantalizing. When 
considering the sheer scale of what the federal government currently invests 
in homeowner subsidies that inure primarily to the benefit of higher income 
households and are completely insensitive to negative housing externalities, 
it is difficult not to wonder what a more carefully considered system of 
allocating subsidies might yield. If done right, a powerful tool could be 
added to the mix of federal housing strategies. 
At the same time, the challenges to successfully implementing smarter 
subsidies on a nationwide basis are daunting, as this article identifies. In 
earlier eras, the potential for inequities, inefficiencies and problems in 
administration would likely have proven too difficult to overcome. Rapidly 
advancing technology and corresponding increases in planning 
sophistication at the community level should ultimately provide the 
opportunity for the federal government to persevere and get a much better 
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return on its massive investment in homeownership. Participation and 
innovation at the community level in designing these subsidies would be 
important catalysts to success. 
VIII. POSTSCRIPT—TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 
In a year that challenged political convention in almost every respect, the 
unexpected also happened with federal income tax reform. As this article 
advanced through the final stages of the publication process, Congress 
introduced, considered and passed a far-reaching package of changes to the 
federal income tax code called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the 
“Act”).320 The entire process took less than two months—warp speed by 
Congressional standards, especially for tax reform. 
As it relates to the homeowner subsidies, the Act represented a victory 
for those this article described in Part VI.A as belonging to the first camp of 
reformers. The Act approximately doubled the size of the standard 
deduction, meaning millions of additional taxpayers will no longer itemize 
deductions.321 This greatly reduces the number of those who will claim two 
of the three principal homeowner subsidies: the mortgage interest deduction 
and the deduction for state and local taxes.322 At the same time, the Act 
reduced the amounts of mortgage interest and state and local taxes that are 
deductible, and eliminated the MID for home equity debt (i.e. mortgage 
financing used for purposes other than to acquire, construct, or substantially 
improve a home).323 A primary goal of the Act’s proponents was to reduce 
                                                                                                                 
320 Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). It was 
signed into law on December 22, 2017. 
321 Id. § 11021. As with many of the individual income tax provisions in the Act, this one 
is due to expire on December 31, 2025. Id. § 11021(a).  
322 See supra notes 32-36, and accompanying text. Estimates as to what percentage of 
taxpayers will itemize deductions with the Act in effect have ranged from between 5% and 
10%. See, e.g., Comparison of Key Provisions in House/Senate Tax Reform Bills, NAT’L 
COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS 1, 2 (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/sites/default/files/documents/comparison-house-senate-
tax-bills-nonprofits.pdf; see also Alexander Casey, Tax Reform With $750k Cap on 
Mortgage Interest Deduction Would Leave 1 in 7 U.S. Homes Eligible, ZILLOW RESEARCH 
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.zillow.com/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-750k-17620/ 
(estimating the percentage of homes for which taking the mortgage interest deduction would 
be worthwhile drops from 44% to 14% as a result of the Act). 
323 For mortgage debt incurred after December 15, 2017, Section 11043 limits the amount 
of mortgage interest that may be deducted to the interest paid on the first $750,000 of 
mortgage debt. Tax Cut and Jobs Act § 11043. It also eliminates the interest deduction for 
new or existing home equity debt. Id. Section 11042 limits the itemized deduction for state 
and local income, sales, and property taxes to $10,000. Id. § 11042. Each of these provisions 
expires on December 31, 2025. Id. §§ 11042(a), 11043(a).  
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long-standing tax expenditures in order to pay for across the board 
corporate and individual income tax rate reductions. This made the 
homeowner subsidies an obvious target, although not all of the attempted 
reductions of the subsidies succeeded.324 
This is not to say that the homeowner subsidies are no longer relevant. 
All three of the principal subsidies survived, and the exclusion of capital 
gains on home sales did so entirely intact. The federal government will 
continue to invest substantially in the homeowner subsidies,325 and it is 
even possible the subsidies will return to their previous form in 2026 after 
certain provisions of the Act expire. Because a smaller percentage of 
taxpayers will itemize and a greater percentage of those that do will be in 
the highest income brackets, an even greater percentage of the homeowner 
subsidies will go to those who need no encouragement to purchase a 
home.326  
Most pertinent to this article is the question of whether the Act makes the 
homeowner subsidies any smarter. The immediate response is “no.” 
Proponents of the Act approached the homeowner subsidies principally as 
opportunities for cost savings, rather than as housing policy tools, and 
sought simply to reduce them as much as politically feasible. Knowing that, 
it is difficult to assert that the reformed subsidies are any smarter except to 
the extent that they do less to fuel certain homeowner behavior that 
exacerbated negative housing externalities. This is not smarter design as 
this article envisions it.327 
                                                                                                                 
324 The exclusion of capital gains on home sales survived in its previous form despite 
efforts to further limit who can qualify for it. See The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act – What it 
Means for Homeowners and Real Estate Professionals, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS 1, 1 
(Dec. 20, 2017), available at http://narfocus.com/billdatabase/clientfiles/172/19/3062.pdf. 
Up to $10,000 of SALT will still be deductible, notwithstanding a proposal to completely 
eliminate it. Id. at 4; see also Heather Long, The Final GOP Tax Bill is Complete, WASH. 
POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/15/the-final-gop-tax-bill-is-
complete-heres-what-is-in-it/?utm_term=.d9e4fac05792.  
325 At the very least, Congress will continue to forgo more than $30 billion per year on the 
home sale capital gain exclusion. See supra note 52. Preliminary estimates suggest that, 
taken together, the MID and SALT will continue to cost close to $100 billion per year in 
forgone tax revenue. Compare 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32, 40, with 
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” FISCAL YEARS 2018–
2027, at 2 (Comm. Print 2017). 
326 In addition, the Act eliminated the Pease limitation, which means high income 
households face one fewer barrier to claiming itemized deductions like the MID and SALT. 
Tax Cut and Jobs Act § 11046; supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
327 In fact, it is possible that the reduction of SALT, without a replacement, could 
negatively impact disinvested communities with higher local tax rates. See, e.g., Matthew J. 
270 University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1 
Looking toward the horizon, however, there may be room for hope. 
Using a larger standard deduction and lower individual tax rates to blunt the 
loss of the mortgage interest deduction for most claimants was perhaps the 
only feasible way of loosening the decades long political stranglehold this 
deduction has had on housing policy. Reducing reliance on what is 
probably the least smart and certainly the most expensive of all of the 
current homeowner subsidies may actually help to clear a path for smarter 
subsidies if the political will to design and approve them can be mustered. 
Time will tell. 
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